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Tyco CEO Dennis Kozlowski transferred $3 million to Seton Hall
University, and in return the university named its business school
―Kozlowski Hall.‖1 A philanthropist typically cannot claim a charitable
deduction to the extent the philanthropist receives a return benefit from
the charity, but a special tax rule effectively values naming rights at
zero.2 The special rule allows naming donors like Kozlowski to deduct
the full amount, in this case $3 million. In contrast, if Tanya Taxpayer
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his excellent research assistance; Heather Dragoo, Class of 2012, for her exemplary editorial skill; and
Terry Kemper for her extremely accurate and efficient work with the manuscript.
1. Anthony Bianco et al., The Rise and Fall of Dennis Kozlowski, BUS. WK., Dec. 23, 2002, at
64, 78, available at http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/02_51/b3813001.htm.
2. See infra Part II.A.
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pays $500 at a charity auction for a vase worth $100, Tanya can only
deduct the $400 excess.3
This special rule for naming rights creates a significant tax revenue
shortfall4 shouldered by all taxpayers generally,5 and may have
pernicious consequences in the charitable world. Charities may choose
to build new structures and offer naming rights to induce mammoth
contributions rather than repair and maintain. Also, philanthropists may
choose to fund new bricks and mortar at the symphony or zoo and enjoy
naming rights, rather than donate to fund unnamed provisions at the
food pantry.
An elephantine transfer to fund a university building, a medical clinic,
or other charitable facility or fund is a socially beneficial, generous act
that society subsidizes with a tax deduction. When the charity provides
naming rights, however, the transaction abides at a complex intersection
of generosity and pride. Anecdotal and empirical evidence demonstrate
that in the new millennium, anonymity for colossal contributions has
become rare, and mega-donors often acquire contractually enforceable,
prestigious naming rights. Prestige can be an end in itself, 6 and these
charitable naming rights signal wealth, power, and generosity, all prized
and envied traits.7
This Article asserts that the economic substance of a charitable
contribution rewarded with naming rights is part gift and part purchase.
Data from other naming situations suggests that the lion‘s share of a
naming philanthropist‘s total transfer to charity is an unrequited gift, 8
but the data also suggests that a portion purchases a return benefit.
Accordingly this Article proposes that Congress should continue to

3. Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-1(h)(5), ex. 2 (1990).
4. See infra note 30 and accompanying text (estimating that in 2007 alone naming rights
donations exceeded $4 billion).
5. Mark P. Gergen, The Case for a Charitable Contribution Deduction, 74 VA. L. REV. 1393,
1402 (1988) (―The cost of a deduction in lost revenues will be allocated capriciously.‖).
6. Richard H. McAdams, Relative Preferences, 102 YALE L.J. 1, 3 (1992) (―[An] important and
often-neglected aspect of human motivation . . . is that . . . actors seek not an absolute end, but relative
position among peers . . . . Whether it is termed ‗status,‘ ‗prestige,‘ or ‗distinction,‘ people sometimes
seek—as an end in itself—relative position . . . .‖).
7. Eric A. Posner, Altruism, Status, and Trust in the Law of Gifts and Gratuitous Promises,
1997 WIS. L. REV. 567, 575–76 (1997).
8. See infra Part III.D.3 and Appendix B.
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allow deductions for the gift portion, but reverse course and prohibit
income tax deductions for the naming portion. This Article also
explores implementation issues.
For ease of reference regarding these part gift and part purchase
transactions, this Article refers to what is colloquially called the
philanthropist‘s donation or contribution as the ―total transfer‖ to the
charity. This Article also provides that the total transfer can have two
parts, namely, the ―purchase price for the naming rights‖ and the ―gift.‖
The gift is the total transfer in excess of the purchase price for the
naming rights.
Existing scholarship considers the theory of the charitable deduction9
and other types of return benefits to donors,10 but has largely ignored the
special tax rule for naming rights. 11 This vogue practice merits
meaningful reform because recent empirical evidence indicates that
naming rights have become ubiquitous, involve gargantuan sums,12 and
are aggressively marketed.
Repealing the special rule will raise formidable issues: Can we
determine or approximate the monetary value of naming rights? 13 What
compliance and administrative costs will ensue? If the naming portion
is no longer deductible, will charitable contributions plummet, causing a
net loss to society? Should the tax law treat naming rights as a return
benefit even though it disregards certain other intangible donor benefits

9. See, e.g., William D. Andrews, Personal Deductions in an Ideal Income Tax, 86 HARV. L.
REV. 309, 344–76 (1972); Mark G. Kelman, Personal Deductions Revisited: Why They Fit Poorly in an
“Ideal” Income Tax and Why They Fit Worse in a Far from Ideal World, 31 STAN. L. REV. 831, 836–59
(1979); see also infra Part III.B.
10. See, e.g., Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., If Judges Were Angels: Religious Equality, Free
Exercise, and the (Underappreciated) Merits of Smith, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1189, 1232–33 (2008)
(discussing intangible religious benefits given in exchange for contributions); Ethan G. Stone, Halos,
Billboards, and the Taxation of Charitable Sponsorships, 82 IND. L.J. 213 (2007) (considering corporate
sponsorship payments to charities for the right to name college football bowl games).
11. But cf. John D. Colombo, The Marketing of Philanthropy and the Charitable Contribution
Deduction: Integrating Theories for the Deduction and Tax Exemption, 36 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 657
(2001) (focusing on the theoretical rationales for granting charitable tax benefits and discussing
charitable naming rights, but arguing that the proper tax treatment of naming arrangements depends on
the theoretical foundation one chooses).
12. See infra note 30 and accompanying text.
13. Colombo, supra note 11, at 665 n.38 (asserting in 2001 this task posed ―almost
insurmountable practical issues of valuation‖).
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such as improved self-image and a warm glow feeling?14 If a charity‘s
ensuing costs are minimal and the naming rights are harmless
grandstanding, why disturb the current paradigm that pleases many?
This Article confronts these challenging issues.
Part I of this Article introduces the relevant facts that compel
scrutiny. Since the mid-1990s charitable naming rights have exploded.15
Naming philanthropists annually transfer over $4 billion16 and receive
notable naming rights over schools, campuses, buildings, endowed
chairs, and a plethora of other facilities and funds.17
Part II describes the general rule that a donor cannot claim a
charitable deduction to the extent the donor receives a return benefit,
and the current special exception for naming rights. Part II also
demonstrates that the government subsidizes up to two-thirds of a
wealthy donor‘s charitable contributions through tax benefits.18
Part III strives to justify the central thesis that part of a charitable
naming transfer is the purchase of a valuable benefit, and the tax law
should treat that benefit as a nondeductible personal expense. The
assertion that a naming right is a valuable return benefit has multiple
pillars of support. Contract law treats a charity‘s promise to provide
naming rights as sufficient consideration to support a bilateral contract.19
Many observers testify to the value of acquiring a favorable reputation:
―Good name in man and woman . . . [i]s the immediate jewel of their
souls.‖20 More recently, a commentator observed that ―to prove to
others that one is wealthy [and generous] one must take actions only
wealthy people can take such as . . . conspicuous donation.‖21 In
addition, modern market practices demonstrate that many
14. See infra notes 287–293 and accompanying text (regarding benefits from charitable giving).
15. TERRY BURTON, NAMING RIGHTS: LEGACY GIFTS & CORPORATE MONEY 49 (2008).
16. See infra note 30 and accompanying text; BURTON, supra note 15, at 50, 126.
17. This Article leaves the analysis of certain types of naming rights for another day, including a
corporation‘s purchase of charitable naming rights, and a donor‘s creation of a private foundation that
bears the donor‘s surname. Also, this proposal would not apply to publicity at press conferences, in
press releases, on websites, in newsletters, and in similar ephemeral manifestations. See infra Appendix
A.
18. See infra Part II.B.
19. See infra notes 105–107 and accompanying text.
20. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, OTHELLO act 3, sc. 3.
21. Posner, supra note 7, at 575.
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philanthropists prize publicity. Also, naming transactions involving
professional football, baseball, and basketball arenas indicate that
naming rights in general are valuable.
Part III also considers implementation. Theoretically, one could
prohibit a naming philanthropist from claiming any charitable
deduction,22 but such a draconian approach would ignore that naming
donors truly give significant amounts in excess of the value of the
naming rights.23 This Article proposes a more balanced approach.
This Article asserts that any naming transfer in excess of a threshold
amount should be split based on the fair market value of the naming
rights.
Current law already provides an instructive valuation
framework, and this Article explores coordinating this proposal with that
extant structure to minimize administrative burdens for philanthropists,
charities, and the government. This Part also discusses using a uniform
fraction approach in case the fair market value approach triggers
excessive administrative and enforcement costs. Part III also addresses
the IRS‘s stated rationales for effectively valuing naming rights at zero,
discusses potential counterarguments, and bridges to broader issues.
In conclusion, Part IV focuses on the proposal‘s primary advantages,
namely equitable sharing of tax burdens, increased respect for the tax
laws, and greater honesty in fundraising, and highlights deeper,
affiliated issues. Appendix A provides a proposed statute, and
Appendix B summarizes data on nineteen professional sports-naming
deals satisfying certain criteria.
I. CHARITABLE NAMING RIGHTS ABOUND
A cynical wag characterized mega-donor mores with the following
strident mantra: ―Maimonides be damned, [we]‘re giving partly in
exchange for the recognition your gift will earn you.‖ 24 Others
22. See infra Part III.D.1.
23. See infra Part III.D.3.
24. Catherine Rampell, [Your Name Here] Chair of Economics, ECONOMIX (Oct. 15, 2009, 4:15
PM), http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/10/15/your-name-here-chair-of-economics/?hp (on file
with author); see also Young v. New York City Transit Auth., 903 F.2d 146, 156 (2d Cir. 1990)
(describing Moses Maimonides as a Medieval Jewish philosopher and mentioning his views on
charitable giving); see also Barlow v. Humana, Inc., 495 So. 2d 1048 (Ala. 1986) (referring to the ―12th
Century Jewish physician and jurist Moses Maimonides‖).
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scornfully pen that naming donors have an ―edifice complex‖25 and pay
―moniker money‖26 to charities.
Such vitriolic remarks do not portray the full spectrum of attitudes
and motivations of all naming donors.
Some philanthropists,
particularly public figures, may allow a charity to publicize their
largesse to encourage others to give or to publicize the charity and its
mission. The Betty Ford Alcoholism Center likely was not named to
enhance the personal reputation of the former first lady. 27 Also many
naming donors likely have mixed motives, joining their quest for
favorable publicity with bona fide generosity and true appreciation for
the mission of their favorite charity.28
Research reveals that anonymous largesse from the wealthy has
become rare,29 and ―deals involving naming rights . . . have expanded
dramatically [since the mid-1990s] in scope, creativity, and dollar
value . . . hitting by one estimate $4 billion in 2007.‖30 Anecdotal
evidence reveals a tripartite expansion: (1) the plurality of persons
expecting naming rights in exchange for hefty donations; (2) the
diversity of naming opportunities available; and (3) the plethora of
charities and public institutions that enthusiastically advertise, offer, and
sell naming rights.

25. Gergen, supra note 5, at 1409.
26. William P. Barrett, Cash Strapped Charities Put Donors’ Names On Just About Everything,
FORBES, 74 (Sept. 21, 2009), available at http://www.forbes.com/forbes/2009/0921/creative-givingcash-strapped-charities-donors-names.html.
27. See infra notes 284–85 and accompanying text.
28. See Colombo, supra note 11, at 669; Stone, supra note 10, at 231; Amihai Glazer & Kai A.
Konrad, A Signaling Explanation for Charity, 86 AM. ECON. REV. 1019, 1021 (1996) (―Donors may
have several motivations for giving.‖).
29. See generally Charles Isherwood, The Graffiti of the Philanthropic Class, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
2, 2007, § 2, at 6 (―Whatever happened to Anonymous? . . . [W]hat became of those wealthy
philanthropists who used to support . . . charitable institutions without requiring that their names be
slapped somewhere–anywhere, it sometimes seems–on a building.‖); Glazer & Konrad, supra note 28,
at 1021 (reporting that in certain years less than one percent of the gifts to Harvard Law School, Yale
Law School, and Carnegie Mellon University listed in their respective annual reports were anonymous);
see also infra notes 54–55 and accompanying text (regarding the Business School at the University of
Wisconsin-Madison).
30. Barrett, supra note 26, at 760; see also BURTON, supra note 15, at 49 (―The tradition of
granting naming rights in exchange for money has been gaining momentum over the last three
decades . . . [s]ince the mid-1990s, there has been a groundswell of naming rights activity.‖).
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A. Plurality of Persons Purchasing Naming Rights
Historically many mega-donors were comparatively modest,31 content
with the evanescent praise from a press release or mention in the charity
newsletter.32 A big gift could certainly garner a prestigious position on
the charity‘s board of directors and otherwise signal status among the
social elite that one had arrived,33 but few donors bargained for a public
monument to their philanthropy designed to apprise all members of
society for decades. In contrast, in the new millennium almost all
substantial benefactors receive notable naming rights.34
31. But see BURTON, supra note 15, at 114 (reporting that in 1502, Henry the VII‘s mother,
Margaret of Richmond, ―established the Lady Margaret Professorship of Divinity‖); Barrett, supra note
26, at 74 (reporting that John Harvard named a university with a gift of 400 books and 779 British
pounds in 1639); William H. Byrnes, IV, The Private Foundation’s Topsy Turvy Road in the American
Political Process, 4 HOUS. BUS. & TAX L.J. 496, 531–32 (2004) (reporting that Rockefeller, Carnegie,
Kellogg, Sage, and other industrial revolution tycoons seized charitable naming opportunities perhaps to
cleanse family names tarnished from sharp business practices).
32. Glazer & Konrad, supra note 28, at 1020–21 (discussing the common practice of listing
donors in an alumni report or newsletter in categories based on the size of the donation).
33. See FRANCIE OSTROWER, WHY THE WEALTHY GIVE: THE CULTURE OF ELITE
PHILANTHROPY 44 (1995) (―[S]pecified levels of donations have also increasingly become a prerequisite
for serving on other bodies associated with the institution . . . . A broader variety of donors also made a
link between giving large sums and getting on the board.‖); Glazer & Konrad, supra note 28, at 1019
(discussing the ―desire to demonstrate wealth, perhaps because individuals prefer to socialize with
individuals of the same or higher social status‖).
34. See Isherwood, supra note 29. There are many examples. The wealthy in all fields seem to
have gotten into the act. Famous funnyman Dave Letterman, for example, established the David
Letterman Telecommunications Scholarship fund at Ball State University, and there is a profusion of
other celebrity naming rights arrangements. See, e.g., Fun Scholarships for College from Funny Guys,
SCHOLARSHOPSGRANTS.US (Apr. 22, 2009), http://www.scholarshipsgrants.us/scholarships-grants/funscholarships-for-college-from-funny. In sports, Tiger Woods is the biggest donor to the Tiger Woods
Learning Center in Anaheim, California. See Tim Lemke, Schooled by Tiger, WASH. TIMES, June 30,
2008, at C01, available at 2008 WLNR 12282561. Basketball‘s Carmelo Anthony donated $3 million
to Syracuse University, and the school named a new basketball practice facility after him. Aaron J.
Lopez, Orange Gets Melo’s Green: Anthony Will Donate $3 Million to Help Fund Practice Facility,
DENVER ROCKY MTN. NEWS, Nov. 8, 2006, at 9C, available at 2006 WLNR 19363977. In a similar
exchange, Anthony contributed to help build the Carmelo Anthony Youth Development Center in
Baltimore. Id. Computer genius Bill Gates transferred $6 million to the Gates Computer Science
Building at Stanford University. Gates Computer Science Building, STANFORD COMPUTER SCIENCE,
http://www-cs.stanford.edu/Info/gates (last visited Mar. 18, 2012). Not to be shut out by Microsoft‘s
champion, Apple Computer co-founder Steve Wozniak‘s generous $1.8 million gift is feted with Woz
Way, the street in front of the Children‘s Discovery Museum of San Jose. Julia Prodis Sulek, Inspiring
Kids in S.J. and Beyond: Children’s Discovery Museum, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, June 16, 2010, at
1A, available at 2010 WLNR 1226042. Many financial moguls are not bashful about their beneficence.
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B. The Graffiti of the Philanthropic Class; Charitable Naming
Everywhere
The types of charitable properties donors can name have multiplied
exponentially. In the new millennium donors‘ names appear on just
about everything.35 In exchange for $100,000, Ellen and Jerome Stern
in Manhattan can now ―see [their] names writ large on the [New
Museum of Contemporary Art‘s] four restrooms.‖36 In recognition of a
$25,000 transfer, the University of Colorado at Bolder displays Brad
Feld‘s name on a men‘s lavatory along with the inscription ―The Best
Ideas Often Come at Inconvenient Times–Don‘t Ever Close Your Mind
to Them.‖37 One scribe states that charitable naming rights have
become the ―graffiti of the philanthropic class.‖38
For tangible items and physical space, the ―opportunities for naming
things are limited only by imagination.‖39 Anonymity has become such
an aberration that in 2007, it was big news when the University of
Wisconsin-Madison raised $85 million for its business school without
granting naming rights.40 One researcher called it ―unprecedented.‖41
Oilman T. Boone Pickens donated $2 million to endow the T. Boone Pickens Distinguished Chair in
Clinical Brain Science at the University of Texas in Dallas. Press Release, The University of Texas at
Dallas, Denise Park Named T. Boone Pickens Distinguished Chair in Clinical Brain Science at UT
Dallas (Aug. 19, 2007), available at http://www.utdallas.edu/news/archive/2007/08-19-001.html. The
―queen of mean,‖ real estate baroness Leona Helmsley, transferred $10 million to a hospital in
Greenwich, Connecticut, to be named for the Helmsleys. People, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Mar. 22,
1996, at 2A, available at 1996 WLNR 5996205. Other financial titans publicizing their philanthropy
include record executive and film producer David Geffen and venture capitalist and financial backer of
Home Depot Kenneth Langone. See Paul Tosto, Is Med School Name Worth $150M?, ST. PAUL
PIONEER PRESS, Nov. 23, 2007, at A1, available at 2007 WLNR 23239695 (describing philanthropy of
Geffen); NYU Medical Center Changes Name, LIFE SCIENCE WEEKLY, Apr. 29, 2008, at 49867,
available at 2008 WLNR 7669294 (describing philanthropy of Langone).
35. Thomas Tryon, We’re Big & Rich, But Are We Generous?, SARASOTA HERALD-TRIB., Apr.
1, 2007, at F1, available at 2007 WLNR 6200158.
36. Michael Gross, Charities Get Inventive with Name-Dropping, MSNBC (June 14, 2006, 2:46
PM), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/25147900.
37. Barrett, supra note 26, at 74.
38. Isherwood, supra note 29, at 26.
39. David Elbert, This City Brought to You By Whoever Buys Rights, DES MOINES REG., June
11, 2006, available at 2006 WLNR 24993838; see also BURTON, supra note 15, at 146.
40. Isherwood, supra note 29, at 26; see also Philip Fine, U.S.: Naming Rights Net Millions—
But
at
a
Price,
UNIV.
WORLD
NEWS
(Mar.
2,
2008),
http://www.universityworldnews.com/article.php?story=20080228160422788.
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In addition to business schools,42 ―medicine, law, and engineering have
had their own share of champagne celebrations for naming gifts.‖ 43 One
researcher found that ―[w]hile only four law schools were named for
[financial benefactors] between 1784 (when the Litchfield Law School
opened its doors) and 1984, in the two decades since then twelve law
schools have been so named.‖44
In addition to school or building naming rights, academic institutions
sell a host of interior space naming rights including the lobby, the
library, the atrium, the auditorium, the conference room, and single
classrooms and lecture halls.45 As part of its capital campaign, the
University of Pittsburgh School of Engineering published a list of
twenty-two naming opportunities with minimum ask amounts,
including: $30 million to name the school; $5 million to name the
atrium; $1 million for the lobby; $500,000 for a digital classroom;
$200,000 for an enhanced learning classroom; $200,000 for the dean‘s
suite; $100,000 for a departmental suite; $50,000 for a departmental
conference room; and $25,000 for a student organization office.46
Other charities sell naming rights to analogous areas. Hospitals sell
naming rights to surgery rooms, nursing stations,47 patient care rooms,
and hallways.48 Performing arts organizations sell naming rights to the
costume storage area and the green room.49 For athletic facilities,

41. BURTON, supra note 15, at 8.
42. Id. at 11, 20 (reporting that there are more named business schools than medical schools).
43. Id. at 11.
44. Robert M. Jarvis, A Brief History of Law School Names, 56 J. LEGAL EDUC. 388, 407 (2006).
45. BURTON, supra note 15, at 167; see also Fine, supra note 40 (stating that a $500,000
donation buys naming rights to a large lecture hall at the University of Virginia); Tim Martin, More
Universities Offer Donors Naming Rights, LANSING ST. J., Jan. 25, 2004, at A1, available at 2004
WLNR 23159360 (stating that you can name a classroom at Central Michigan University College of
Business for $50,000).
46. BURTON, supra note 15, at 104.
47. See, e.g., Howard Greninger, New Union Hospital Expected to Open in Early 2010, TRIB.
STAR (Terre Haute, Ind.), Mar. 15, 2009, available at 2009 WLNR 4939816 (―Naming rights for
sections of the new Union Hospital . . . have raised more than $4.23 million . . . naming rights to all
nursing stations . . . have been claimed by various donors.‖); see generally BURTON, supra note 15, at
109.
48. BURTON, supra note 15, at 137.
49. See, e.g., Alice Warchol, Theater Group Gets a New Home Downtown, VIRGINIA-PILOT &
LEDGER STAR, Nov. 22, 2009, at 1, available at 2009 WLNR 23564094.
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donors can name the scoreboard, coaches‘ offices, the locker room, and
the weight room.50 Many charities sell naming rights to reception areas,
staircases, elevators, and staff lounges,51 plus the grounds, roads,
parking facilities, and walkways.52 At the Louisville Zoo, you can name
the sea otter exhibit for $1.5 million, and at the Salisbury Zoo in
Maryland you can name the wallaby exhibit for $250,000.53
In addition to naming rights over tangible items and spaces,
philanthropists can name a wide variety of funds.
―Named
54
professorships are more common than grass in the summer.‖ Schools
have tinkered with the titles of named professorships to create up to
fifteen different labels that may appeal to diverse patrons.55 One
consultant proposes a price list that asks for donations from $4 million
to $7 million for either a Presidential or a Chancellor‘s Endowed Chair,
$3 to $5 million for a Regent‘s Endowed Chair, down to as low as
$500,000 for an endowed chair for a term of years.56
Other charities sell their own versions of endowed chairs as
―fundraising commodit[ies].‖57 ―From YMCAs to the local museum
and art gallery, from hospitals to international environmental groups,
there is an ever-widening group of nonprofit organizations using some
variation[] of an endowed chair . . . .‖58 Libraries and museums can sell
the names to the curator positions; medical facilities can sell the naming
rights to clinical and surgical staff positions, and other nonprofits can
sell naming rights to key staff positions.59 In addition, donors can name
other funds; the ask amount to name a graduate fellowship at MIT is $1

50. BURTON, supra note 15, at 135.
51. Id. at 137.
52. Id. at 135; see also supra note 34 (discussing Woz Way at the Children's Discovery Museum
in San Jose, California).
53. Barrett, supra note 26, at 76 (sea otter exhibit); Renew the Zoo: Naming Opportunities for
Australian Outback, SALISBURY ZOO, http://www.renewthezoo.com/naming-for-australian-outback.html
(last visited Mar. 28, 2012) (wallaby exhibit).
54. Fine, supra note 40 (quoting Jonathon Knight of the Association of American University
Professors).
55. See BURTON, supra note 15, at 120.
56. Id. at 122–23.
57. Id. at 119.
58. Id. at 119.
59. Id. at 120.

Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2012

11

University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 80, Iss. 1 [2012], Art. 2

64

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 80

million, and for $50,000 you can name an endowed lecture series at the
University of Miami.60
C. Plethora of Organizations Marketing Naming Rights
Overall ―[t]he [charitable] education sector continues to lead the way
in terms of the number of naming opportunities‖61 and ―healthcare [and
research facilities] . . . appear to be riding [education‘s] coattails.‖62
Niche markets for naming rights grew at double digit rates in 2007, and
included environmental groups, arts and cultural organizations, and
religious schools.63 Many other charities eligible to receive tax
deductible contributions sell naming rights, from the Salvation Army to
the YWCA.64
In addition to allowing a tax deduction for charitable contributions,
the federal income tax system also permits a deduction for donations to
governments and their agencies.65 Public entities from the federal
government to the local school district sell naming rights. As of 2007,
naming arrangements for state and federal government properties,
especially parks, were growing at double digit rates, 66 [and] ―[p]ublic
universities [had] joined their private counterparts in the name game.‖67
Public grade schools and high schools hopped on the bandwagon in
2001 when the Brooklawn School Board in New Jersey sold the right to
name the elementary school‘s gymnasium to the ShopRite grocery chain
for $100,000.68 ―[W]ithin a few months of the Brooklawn deal, dozens–
60. Fine, supra note 40.
61. BURTON, supra note 15, at 188.
62. Id. at 14, 20, 187 (The ―[n]ext big sector will be healthcare . . . [which includes] hospitals,
clinics, [and] medical research facilities . . . .‖).
63. Id. at 188.
64. Id. at xiv; id. at 65 (stating that social service agencies and youth organizations also sell
naming rights).
65. I.R.C. § 170(c)(1) (2011) (allowing a deduction for contributions to a ―State, a possession of
the United States, or any political subdivision of any of the foregoing, or the United States or the District
of Columbia‖).
66. BURTON, supra note 15, at 188.
67. Fine, supra note 40.
68. Tamar Lewin, In Public Schools, the Name Game as a Donor Lure, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26,
2006, at A1; Joseph Blocher, School Naming Rights and the First Amendment’s Perfect Storm, 96 GEO.
L.J. 1, 2 n.1 (2007) (citing Robert Strauss, Education: P.S. (Your Name Here), N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16,
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if not hundreds–of public schools had signed naming rights deals
[for] . . . stadiums and athletic [venues] . . . libraries, hallways, and other
facilities.‖69 By 2007 ―[s]chool boards across the country [had] entered
into naming rights deals whose combined value . . . stretches into the
hundreds of millions of dollars.‖70
D. Empirical Evidence on the Rise of Name-Dropping for Munificence
A national study71 finds that charitable naming rights have exploded
since the mid-1990s.72 The study concluded that in 2007 alone,
―American nonprofits are estimated to have logged over $4 billion in
naming rights deals.‖73 The top ten naming rights arrangements
amounted to almost $1.5 billion.74 The ―next [sixteen] named gifts
made in 2007 added up to another $595 million.‖75 Thus, the twenty-six
top named gifts alone totaled approximately $2 billion in 2007. The
researchers also studied marketing trends, finding that ―[i]n the winter of
2008 . . . there were more than 50,000 naming opportunities published
on the Web sites of nonprofits.‖76
II. CURRENT RULES VALUE NAMING RIGHTS AT ZERO
The applicable statute allows a charitable income tax deduction only
for a contribution or gift,77 and the U.S. Supreme Court has stated ―[t]he
sine qua non of a charitable contribution is a transfer of money or
2001, § 14NJ, at 6).
69. Blocher, supra note 68, at 8; id. at 6 (―One recent study found that schools receive $2.4
billion a year from corporate relationships, more than the 2003 educational expenditures of twelve states
and the District of Columbia.‖).
70. Id. at 2.
71. See BURTON, supra note 15, at xi (stating that Dig In Research conducted the study).
72. Id. at 49 (describing a ―groundswell of naming rights activities‖).
73. Id. at 50, 126.
74. Id. at 50–51. The researchers provided a top twelve list, but the list included a corporate
naming rights arrangement (Hewlett Packard Foundation donating for endowed professorships at the
University of California, Berkeley) and a geographically named fund (the ―Oregon Athletics Legacy
Fund‖ at the University of Oregon). Id.
75. Id. at 51.
76. Id. at 169.
77. I.R.C. § 170(c) (2011).
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property without adequate consideration.‖78 When a ―payment has the
‗dual character‘ of a contribution and a purchase . . . [a] taxpayer may
[only] claim a deduction for the difference between [the] payment to
[the] charitable organization and the market value of the benefit received
in return.‖79
A. Current Tax Rules
Currently there are no statutory or regulatory provisions directly
applying this dual character approach when a charity provides naming
rights to a donor.80 Rather than apply the dual character approach
without detailed statutory rules, the Treasury Department and the IRS
have adopted a series of authorities effectively valuing naming rights at
zero, which allows naming donors to deduct their total transfers to
charity. In a ruling directly considering public recognition and the
charitable deduction statute, the IRS stated that valuable return benefits
must be identified, but ―[s]uch privileges as being associated with or
being known as a benefactor of the organization are not significant
return benefits . . . .‖81 Under a related Treasury Regulation, public
recognition is effectively valued at zero when a charity agrees to name a
building after the donor.82 Additional IRS rulings effectively value
naming rights at zero when a charity (1) agrees to change its name to
match the donor‘s name for one hundred years83 or (2) agrees to name
its defining attraction after a donor.84
78. United States v. Am. Bar Endowment, 477 U.S. 105, 118 (1986).
79. Id. at 117 (adopting the general IRS approach that a donor can only claim a charitable
deduction for the amount transferred in excess of the return benefit); see also Rev. Rul. 67-246, 1967-2
C.B. 104, 105.
80. See I.R.C. § 170 (2006); see also Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-13(f)(8)(i)(B) (1996).
81. Rev. Rul. 68-432, 1968-2 C.B. 104.
82. Treas. Reg. § 53.4941(d)-2(f)(2) (1973) (concluding that the building naming rights were
merely incidental or tenuous return benefits and therefore did not violate the self-dealing rules, even
though the self-dealing rules generally prohibit a private foundation from entering into a transaction
providing a benefit to a substantial contributor).
83. Rev. Rul. 73-407, 1973-2 C.B. 383 (stating, ―[a] court determined that the charity had the
power to bind itself not to change its name for one hundred years,‖ and concluding that naming rights
are disregarded because they are an incidental and tenuous benefit under the self-dealing rules).
84. Rev. Rul. 77-367, 1977-2 C.B. 193 (stating ―the corporation benefits by having the village
named after it, by having its name associated with the village in conjunction with its own advertising
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These IRS authorities fail to provide a detailed, theoretical analysis,
but three brief references suggest the IRS rationales: (1) naming rights
are incidental to the charity fulfilling its charitable mission,85 (2) naming
rights are not ―significant return benefits,‖86 and (3) naming rights have
no ―monetary value.‖87 Part III.C of this Article addresses these points.
Tax practitioners have seized upon these authorities to conclude that
their philanthropic clients can deduct the entire amount given to charity
even when the donor acquires valuable, legally enforceable naming
rights,88 and that advice appears accurate under IRS practices.
Charitable naming arrangements are highly publicized,89 but as of
December 31, 2010, there are no published court cases or rulings
challenging a naming donor.90 Furthermore, the IRS operating manual
as of December 31, 2010 provides no suggestion that IRS auditors
should challenge naming philanthropists.91

program, and by having its name mentioned in each publication of the organization that it finances,‖ but
the IRS ignores these benefits, effectively valuing the naming and associated rights at zero).
85. Id. at 194 (―Although the corporation benefits by having the [charity‘s] village named after it
. . . such benefits are merely incidental . . . .‖); Rev. Rul. 73-407, 1973-2 C.B. 383 (―The public
recognition the [donor] receives from the [charitable entity being named after the donor for one hundred
years] . . . is an incidental and tenuous benefit . . . .‖).
86. Rev. Rul. 68-432, 1968-2 C.B. 104 (stating that ―being known as a benefactor‖ is not a
―significant return benefit‖).
87. Id. at 104 (indicating that public recognition has no ―monetary value‖).
88. See JOSEPH P. TOCE, JR., ET AL., TAX ECONOMICS OF CHARITABLE GIVING 197 (2006–2007
ed. 2006) (discussing donor recognition and concluding ―the contribution deduction amount should be
unaffected‖); John V. Woodhull and Vreni R. Jones, The Who’s Who and What’s What of Charitable
Fundraisers, 13 J. TAX‘N EXEMPT ORG. 23 (2001) (―[T]he naming of a building after a donor is
considered an incidental benefit for purposes of the self-dealing rules. It is arguable that these types of
incidental benefits should also be treated as incidental benefits for purposes of determining the extent to
which the donor is entitled to [an I.R.C.] Section 170 deduction.‖).
89. See supra Parts I.A–I.C.
90. See BARBARA L. KIRSCHTEN & CARLA NEELEY FREITAG, CHARITABLE CONTRIBUTIONS:
INCOME TAX ASPECTS, 863-2 TAX MGM‘T A-37 to A-67 (2011) (providing a lengthy section on
contributions to charities and the ―receipt of consideration in specific settings;‖ the section includes no
cases involving naming rights).
91. I.R.S. MANUAL § 4.76.50.7, available at 2007 WL 2643492 (citing American Bar
Endowment and Rev. Rul. 67-246, and discussing transfers to charity with the dual character of a
purchase and a contribution, but failing to address naming rights).
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B. The Charitable Deduction as a Government Subsidy
When a donor claims a tax deduction for a charitable contribution, the
government subsidizes a portion.92 If a donor taxed at the thirty-five
percent marginal income tax rate93 contributes $1 million to a charity,
the donor effectively gives only $650,000 to the charity because the
federal government reimburses the donor for the other $350,000 in
foregone taxes.94
The subsidy is larger if the donor otherwise would have retained the
$1 million until death and the $1 million would have been subject to
both federal income tax and estate tax. In the absence of the charitable
donation, the federal government would have collected an additional
$292,500 in estate tax.95 Thus, in the case of a lifetime charitable gift
shortly before a wealthy96 donor‘s death, the government may bear
almost two-thirds of the total cost,97 and the donor (and the donor‘s
estate) would incur only one-third. Even if the donor contributes a
decade before death and the tax savings takes into account the time
value of money, the total government subsidy approximates fifty
92. David A. Super, Privatization, Policy Paralysis, and the Poor, 96 CAL. L. REV. 393, 446
(2008) (―[T]he government makes open-ended offers to subsidize [charities] through tax deductions for
charitable contributions.‖).
93. I.R.C. § 1(i)(2) (2006); Rev. Proc. 2011-12, § 2.01, 2011-2 I.R.B. 297 (stating that in 2011
the highest federal income tax rate on individuals is 35 percent).
94. Assuming a flat 35 percent tax rate, if the taxpayer has $2 million of taxable income for the
year and no tax deductions or credits, the taxpayer would pay $700,000 in federal income taxes and
would have $1.3 million remaining. In contrast, if that taxpayer donates $1 million in cash to a public
charity, the taxpayer will only have taxable income of $1 million ($2 million - $1 million = $1 million),
will pay federal income tax of $350,000 ($1 million x 35% = $350,000), and will have $650,000
remaining after the charitable donation and the tax payment ($2 million - $1 million - $350,000 =
$650,000). Thus, the taxpayer has $650,000 less as a result of the contribution ($1,300,000 - $650,000
= $650,000), and the government collected $350,000 less in taxes ($700,000 - $350,000). As a result,
the $1 million donation cost the taxpayer $650,000 and the government $350,000.
95. In the absence of the $1 million lifetime charitable contribution, the taxpayer would have
paid an additional $350,000 in federal income tax. As a result the estate tax is calculated on $650,000
rather than the full $1 million. At a 45 percent rate the federal estate tax on $650,000 is $292,500.
I.R.C. § 2001(c)(2) (2006) (45% rate).
96. In this discussion, the term wealthy refers to taxpayers subject to the federal estate tax. For
decedent‘s dying in 2011, an estate will only pay estate tax if the decedent‘s taxable estate exceeds $5
million. I.R.C. § 2010(c)(2)(A) (2011).
97. The $1 million charitable contribution generates $350,000 of federal income tax savings and
$292,500 of federal estate tax savings for a combined tax savings of $642,500. See supra note 95.
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percent.98
This public subsidy justifies government scrutiny of
charitable transactions.99
III. PROPOSAL FOR BALANCED TAXATION: PARSING NAMING TRANSFERS
This Part seeks to justify the proposal for parsing naming transfers
Specifically, this Part sets forth the reasons for the fundamental claim
that the price paid for the naming rights should not be deductible,
explores whether the proposal is consistent with prevailing charitable
tax theories, and responds to the stated Treasury Department and IRS
rationales for current law. This Part then discusses implementation and
addresses counterarguments.
A. Reasons the Naming Portion Should Not Be Deductible
1. No Contribution to the Extent the Philanthropist Receives a Benefit
The charitable deduction exists to encourage contributions.100 The
deduction is only available for a ―contribution.‖101
The word
contribution in this context is synonymous with gift, 102 and ―[t]he sine
qua non of a . . . contribution is a transfer of money or property without

98. The income tax savings is $350,000 or 35 percent of the $1 million donation. In regards to
the estate tax, the present value of $292,500 payable in ten years is $179,569.62 (at a presumed interest
rate of five percent compounded annually). See Present Value Calculator, CALCULATORSOUP,
http://www.calculatorsoup.com/calculators/financial/present-value.php (last visited Mar. 30, 2009).
Thus, the income tax savings and the estate tax savings combined would reduce the total tax by
$529,569.62, or slightly more than 50 percent of the $1 million contribution.
99 Jeffrey Toobin, Rich Bitch: The Legal Battle Over Trust Funds for Pets, NEW YORKER, Sept.
29, 2008, at 38, 47 (quoting Vartan Gregorian, President of Carnegie, Inc.) (―[O]nce [the government]
started giving tax deductions, which amounted to a publicly approved subsidy, [the mega-donors] had to
prove that the money was going for a philanthropic purpose . . . .‖).
100. Gergen, supra note 5, at 1396.
101. I.R.C. § 170(a)(1) (2006).
102. See I.R.C. § 170(c) (2006) (stating that ―the term ‗charitable contribution‘ means a
contribution or gift . . . .‖); see also Rev. Rul. 67-246, 1967-2 C.B. 104, 105 (―To be deductible as a
charitable contribution for Federal income tax purposes . . . a payment . . . must be a gift. To be a
gift . . . there must be, among other requirements, a payment of money or transfer of property without
adequate consideration.‖); see also KIRSCHTEN & FREITAG, supra note 90, at A-22.
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adequate consideration.‖103 Based on these fundamental tenets, to the
extent the charity provides the donor with a return benefit there is no
gift, and therefore, no tax incentive is needed to encourage the transfer,
and no charitable deduction should be available.104 Many sources
support the view that naming rights are a valuable return benefit,
including (1) contract law, (2) perceptive commentators observing
charitable market behavior generally, (3) actual practices in the
charitable naming market, and (4) data on professional sports arena
naming deals.
a. Contract Law Treats Naming Rights as Valuable Consideration
In 1927 Justice Cardozo for the New York Court of Appeals
famously concluded that a charity‘s assumption of an obligation to
publicize the donor‘s name in connection with the receipt of a charitable
gift or pledge is valid consideration to create an enforceable bilateral
contract.105 Justice Cardozo‘s ―seminal‖106 opinion has been cited by
―innumerable courts.‖107
b. Commentary on the Benefits of Naming and Reputation
Charitable naming rights can enhance the donor's personal reputation.
Professor Posner and others recognize that a substantial charitable gift
signals wealth, generosity,108 and social status to others.109 ―Because
103. United States v. Am. Bar Endowment, 477 U.S. 105, 118 (1986).
104. See Rev. Rul. 67-246, 1967-2 C.B. 104 (stating that a donor cannot deduct a payment to
charity to the extent the donor receives a return benefit).
105. Allegheny Coll. v. Nat‘l Chautauqua Cnty. Bank, 159 N.E. 173, 176 (N.Y. 1927) (―When the
[charity] subjected itself to such a duty at the implied request of the [donor], the result was the creation
of a bilateral agreement.‖). But see Lawrence A. Cunningham, Cardozo and Posner: A Study in
Contracts, 36 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1379, 1402 (1995) (stating that Justice Cardozo‘s ―analysis in
Allegheny College is regularly criticized as contrived and artificial‖); Peter Linzer, Consider
Consideration, 44 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1317, 1324 (2000) (―[S]ome would say [Justice Cardozo‘s legal
analysis compares] with the misdirection of a three-card monte pitchman on the New York City
subway.‖).
106. Arthur B. Schwartz, Note, The Second Circuit Estopped: There Is No Promissory Estoppel in
New York, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 1201, 1217 (1997).
107. Id.
108. Posner, supra note 7, at 575; Glazer & Konrad, supra note 28, at 1024 (―Charitable
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one‘s wealth [and generosity are] not easily observable, to prove to
others that one is wealthy [and generous] one must take actions that only
wealthy people can take such as conspicuous consumption and
conspicuous donation.‖110 Conspicuous donation is the exclusive
approach when ―conspicuous consumption [is] banned by social
norms.‖111
The father of modern economics, Adam Smith, asserted that the rich
seek ever greater wealth to garner the adulation of others rather than for
any physical pleasure.112
[I]t is chiefly [for] the sentiments of mankind, that we pursue riches . . . .
To be observed, to be attended to, to be taken notice of
with . . . approbation, are all the advantages which we propose to derive
from it . . . . The rich man glories in his riches, because he feels that they
naturally draw upon him the attention of the world . . . .113

In his seminal treatise THE WEALTH OF NATIONS, Smith remarked
―the chief enjoyment of riches consists in the parade of riches, which in
their eye is never so complete as when they appear to possess those
decisive marks of opulence which nobody can possess but
themselves.‖114
In her book WHY THE WEALTHY GIVE, Francie Ostrower analyzes the
responses of one hundred wealthy New York donors115 and concludes
that philanthropy is intimately intertwined with an individual‘s cultural
identity.

donations which are observable can signal wealth or income.‖).
109. OSTROWER, supra note 33, at 3 (stating that philanthropy is an ―institution . . . [that] plays a
central and defining role in upper-class culture‖).
110. Posner, supra note 7, at 575.
111. Glazer & Konrad, supra note 28, at 1019.
112. ADAM SMITH, THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS 112–113 (D.D. Raphael & A.L. Macfie,
eds., Clarendon Press, 1976) (1759) [hereinafter SMITH, MORAL SENTIMENTS], quoted in McAdams,
supra note 6, at 10.
113. SMITH, MORAL SENTIMENTS, supra note 112, at 112–13.
114. ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS
(Edwin Cannan ed. University of Chicago Press 1976) (1777), quoted in McAdams, supra note 6, at 11
n.29.
115. OSTROWER, supra note 33, at 20–21 (stating that one-fourth of the donors interviewed
contributed over half-a-million dollars; half contributed over $100,000; three-quarters contributed
$20,000 or more, and the balance contributed between $5,000 and $20,000).
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Philanthropy becomes a mark of class status that contributes to defining
and maintaining the cultural and organizational boundaries of elite
life . . . . Philanthropy becomes a way of being part of Society and one of
the avenues by which Society makes its connections. Philanthropy is one
of the activities [which] contribute to facilitating cohesion among elite
groups.116

c. Market Practices Show that Recognition is a Benefit
In addition, market behavior in the new millennium demonstrates that
charitable naming rights have value. An experienced consultant
observes that a ―charity‘s [fundraisers] may say the naming rights are
secondary, but donors making these kinds of gifts think otherwise.‖117
When conducting a major capital campaign, charities now
customarily offer naming rights,118 specifying the ask amount for the
right to name the building and various components. Typically the
building naming right goes to the donor contributing the most. In a
world in which it may be debatable who is best, greatest, or most
stupendous, the naming rights market often allows one person to buy the
undisputed top spot.
In a fascinating behavioral display perhaps designed to demarcate a
linear hierarchical strata119 with the clarity extant in various segments of
the animal kingdom,120 one researcher discovered that naming rights
typically cascade in multiples of two.121 If the ask amount for naming
116. Id. at 6 (emphasis added).
117. BURTON, supra note 15, at 146.
118. Id. at xx (―Putting naming rights on the market [is] . . . commonplace these days.‖).
119. Raffaele Caterina, Comparative Law and the Cognitive Revolution, 78 TUL. L. REV. 1501,
1538 (2004) (―An animal species may organize its social life through a rigid dominance
hierarchy . . . .‖); Andy Soos, Pigeon Commander, ENVTL. NEWS NETWORK (Apr. 8, 2010, 11:57 AM),
http://www.enn.com/wildlife/article/41197 (―Dominance hierarchies can be despotic or linear. In a
despotic hierarch, only one individual is dominant while the others are equally submissive. In a linear
hierarchy . . . each individual dominates all individuals below him and not those above him.‖).
120. Mark F. Grady & Michael T. McGuire, A Theory of the Origin of Natural Law, 8 J.
CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES, 87, 105 n.81 (1997) (―[L]inear and near-linear hierarchies exist among certain
kinds of wasps and bumblebees; various birds, such as chickens [the pecking order]; domestic
mammals, such as cows and ponies; wild mammals, such as coyotes and buffaloes, [and] primates, such
as rhesus monkeys, baboons, and vervets.‖).
121. BURTON, supra note 15, at 166 (―In over 90 percent of the pricing strategies I have
examined, nonprofits typically use a double-up and/or double-down [approach] when setting the ask
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the building is $5 million, usually the next highest amount will be $2.5
million (perhaps for the lobby, the library or the atrium), the next
highest will be $1.25 million (perhaps for the conference room or
executive suite), and so on.122 This ―multiple of two‖ marketing method
likely is no accident; it allows donors to buy at distinct rungs on the
power, prestige, and generosity ladder. Professor Posner observes that
"reputation for generosity is a positional good,"123 and it appears that the
modern structure of ask amounts assigns donors to relative status
positions.
The benefit of prestige appears evident when donors aggressively
bargain for recognition. In addition to the surname writ large on the
building, atrium, library, common area, classroom, or other physical
structure, donors sometimes negotiate for ancillary acknowledgments,
such as a plaque124 and portrait (life size for some)125 in the entrance,
vestibule, foyer, or the lobby, special signage on the facade and the
interior (and accompanying lighting),126 appearance of the surname on
all letterhead127 and business cards, along with a host of fleeting praise
benefits including honors at an awards luncheon or dinner,128 thanks at
the groundbreaking ceremony,129 photo opportunities with the charity's
top brass, press releases, website coverage, and articles in the
organization's newsletter.130 Some donors even insist on having their
amounts for named gifts.‖).
122. BURTON, supra note 15, at 166–7.
123. Posner, supra note 7, at 576.
124. Multiple commercial firms specialize in engraving and selling donor recognition items
including plaques, stained glass windows, donor trees (with a donor‘s name on each leaf), lamps, and
entire donor recognition walls. See, e.g., DONORWALL DESIGN GRP., http://www.donorwall.com (last
visited Nov. 9, 2011); PARTNERS IN RECOGNITION, INC., http://www.partnersinrecognition.com (last
visited Nov. 9, 2011).
125. See William A. Drennan, Surnamed Charitable Trusts: Immortality at Taxpayer Expense, 61
ALA. L. REv. 225, 232 (2010).
126. See Christina Macone-Greene, Artist’s Title and Mosaic Works a Big Part of City’s New
Library, SAN DIEGO UNION TRIB., July 25, 2010, available at 2010 WLNR 15175282 (discussing a
―donor mosaic mural‖).
127. BURTON, supra note 15, at 63 (―Suitable outdoor signage can be extended to the letterhead of
the organization and all organizational media material . . . .‖).
128. Posner, supra note 7, at 574 n.18 (a charity may treat the donor ―like royalty‖).
129. BURTON, supra note 15, at 63 (―The cutting of the Red Ribbon is included in the high-profile
named gift, with stakeholders in attendance.‖). Id. at 67.
130. Id. at 168 (discussing ―virtual acknowledgement[s] on [the charity‘s] website‖).
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names at the top of every page of the charity‘s website.131 The charity
and the donor may detail all of these terms in a naming rights
agreement132 negotiated before the donor pledges.
d. Pro Sports Arena Naming Deals Reflect the Benefit of Naming
In 2010, over two-thirds of the ―121 teams that play North America‘s
top four pro sports games (baseball, hockey, football, and
basketball) . . . have their home stadiums and arenas named after
corporate sponsors.‖133 Appendix B lists the total construction cost of
the facility and the price of the naming and associated rights for nineteen
pro sports venues constructed between 1994 and 2004.134 In all of those
naming deals the named buyer agreed to pay the equivalent of at least
four percent, and in some cases over twenty percent, of the total
construction cost, on a present value basis. Although it could be
expanded and refined,135 the data in Appendix B indicates that naming
131. Id. at 78 (―This style of naming rights recognition is . . . seen as an acceptable form in both
the private and nonprofit sectors.‖).
132. Id. at 156, 158; How Much Are Naming Rights Worth?, NONPROFIT EDGE (DeLeon & Stang,
Gaithersburg, M.D.) Sept. 2009, available at http://www.deleonandstang.com/news-articles/nonprofitedge-article/how-much-are-naming-rights-worth/ (―The arrangement should include a formal written
agreement . . . .‖);
see,
e.g.,
Naming
Rights
Agreement,
Clinton,
Okla.
http://agendas.clintonokla.org/010308/SCHUMACHERAGREEMENT.pdf (noting that in exchange for
donations from Walt Schumacher, the county recreational authority agrees to call facilities Schumacher
Fields ―in accordance with graphics and color guidelines established by Walt Schumacher . . . .‖).
133. Troy St. Louis, The Cost of Owning Stadium & Arena Naming Rights, ASKMEN.COM,
http:www.askmen.com/sports/business_100/106_sports_business.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2012); see
also Timothy D. DeSchriver & Paul E. Jensen, What’s in a Name? Price Variation in Sport Facility
Naming Rights, 29 E. ECON. J. 359, 360 (2003) (reporting that in 2003 more than half of all major pro
sport facilities carried the name of a corporation).
134. The nineteen are the naming deals between 1994 and 2004 in which the commercial buyer
agreed to pay for the naming and associated rights in equal installments over twenty years, as reported
by the League of Fans website. See infra note 315 (explaining that one deal was excluded because of
unusual terms). Figures in Appendix B presume in each case that the facility has a forty-year life and
the commercial sponsor will pay an equal amount each year over the forty-year life. For tax
depreciation purposes, a stadium has a forty-year life. I.R.C. § 168(g)(2)(C)(ii) (1996); see also Logan
E. Gans, Take Me Out to the Ball Game, But Should the Crowd’s Taxes Pay for It?, 29 VA. TAX REV.
751, 785 (2010).
135. The study could include naming rights deals lasting more or less than twenty years, and
could describe the extent of the associated rights acquired, such as rights to operate concession stands,
use billboards, and enjoy luxury boxes or other special privileges or benefits. See infra notes 233–35
and accompanying text.
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and associated rights have significant value. This stands in contrast to
the IRS position that effectively treats naming rights as valueless. 136
2. Personal Expenses Are Not Deductible
A cardinal principle of income taxation is that personal expenses are
not deductible.137 If taxpayers could deduct personal expenses, the tax
system would subsidize profligate spending,138 discourage investment,
and visit unequal treatment upon otherwise similarly situated
taxpayers.139
3. Horizontal Equity, Voluntary Compliance, and Candor in Fundraising
The need for this Article‘s proposal is bolstered by the current
disparate treatment of similarly situated taxpayers, which is contrary to
the goal of horizontal equity.140 Current rules specifically trim the
deduction for a donor who contributes to a charity and receives the right
to attend a buffet dinner,141 but allows a deduction for every penny
transferred when a donor contributes and receives the right to name a
building.142
136. See Rev. Rul. 68-432, 1968-2 C.B. 104, 105 (―being known as a benefactor . . . has no
monetary value . . . .‖).
137. I.R.C. § 262 (2006); see Tsilly Dagan, Ordinary People, Necessary Choices: A Comparative
Study of Childcare Expenses, 11 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN LAW 589, 590 (2010).
138. Daniel I. Halperin, Business Deduction for Personal Living Expenses: A Uniform Approach
to an Unsolved Problem, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 859, 861 (1974) (reporting President Kennedy‘s
observation that allowing businesses and their executives to deduct entertainment expenses
―encourage[s] . . . luxury spending as a charge on the Federal Treasury . . . .‖).
139. JOEL S. NEWMAN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 143 (5th ed. 2012) (―[M]ost would agree
that one‘s personal lifestyle choices should not affect one‘s tax bill.‖).
140. Horizontal equity is a fundamental goal of U.S. taxation. See Steve R. Johnson, An IRS Duty
of Consistency: The Failure of Common Law Making and a Proposed Legislative Solution, 77 TENN. L.
REV. 563, 590–91 (2010); see also Andre Smith & Carlton Waterhouse, No Reparation Without
Taxation: Applying the Internal Revenue Code to the Concept of Reparations for Slavery and
Segregation, 7 PITT. TAX REV. 159, 176 (2010); see also Kelly A. Moore, Previously Taxed Property
Credit and the 2035(B) Gross Up, 34 S. ILL. U. L.J. 275, 285 (2010).
141. Rev. Rul. 67-246, 1967-2 C.B. 104, 110 (in Example 8 the donor contributes $15 and may
attend a motion picture and a buffet, and the IRS concludes that the donor can only deduct the amount of
the contribution which exceeds the value of admission to the movie and the buffet).
142. See supra Part II.A.
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This segues to the next policy justification, concerns about respect for
the U.S. tax system. The U.S. tax system depends on voluntary
compliance.143 When taxpayers perceive that the tax laws are unjust,
experts observe that compliance drops and egregious tax behavior
proliferates.144 The current exception for the naming portion may be the
type of provision that engenders distrust and demoralizes otherwise
acquiescent taxpayers.
Furthermore, the current paradigm forces charitable administrators
and fundraisers into duplicative behavior, and requires that charities
issue dubious documents. The charitable market effectively mandates
that a charity conducting a significant capital campaign grant naming
rights.145 A charitable administrator committed to the institution's
mission will want to raise adequate funds to provide charitable services
and benefits for the poor, the homeless, the unemployed, the patients,
the students, or the other charitable class benefited. A charity that does
not sell naming rights may fail to secure key donations, and the charity‘s
mission may suffer.146
Once the charity resolves to sell naming rights, the charity‘s
fundraising officers must take steps more appropriate for a commercial
business. Like a for-profit merchant, the charity must: (1) create an
inventory of the naming rights for sale,147 (2) engage in a marketing
strategy,148 (3) select whether to display its product line of naming rights
on the institution's website using a ―descriptive text‖ approach or
employing the very popular ―shopping list‖ method,149 and (4)establish
143. United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805, 815 (1984) (―Our complex and
comprehensive system of federal taxation, relying as it does upon self-assessment and reporting,
demands that all taxpayers be forthright in the disclosure of relevant information to the taxing
authorities.‖); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 335 (1973).
144. James Andreoni, Brian Erard & Jonathon Feinstein, Tax Compliance, 36 J. ECON.
LITERATURE 818, 851 (1998) (―In psychological terms, an unfair tax system could lead people to
‗rationalize‘ cheating.‖); see also Marjorie E. Kornhauser, A Tax Morale Approach to Compliance:
Recommendations for the IRS, 8 FLA. TAX REV. 599, 613 (2007).
145 See BURTON, supra note 15, at xx (―Putting naming rights on the market
[is] . . . commonplace these days . . . .‖); id. at 7–8.
146. See id. at xvii (indicating that charities must offer naming rights to raise needed funds).
147. Id. at 134–39.
148. See id. at 125–26 (discussing the fundraiser‘s toolbox and the use of that toolbox ―to sell
naming rights to donors and sponsors‖) (emphasis added).
149. Id. at 160–61 (comparing the shopping list approach and the descriptive approach); see also
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the ask amount for the various naming rights for sale.150 Similar to a
franchisor that adopts uniform policies for all its outlets, many
institutions adopt a naming rights policy so that each department, unit,
or affiliate will utilize consistent advertising, marketing, and selling
policies.151
After all this commercial behavior—and in spite of the valuable
naming rights given to the donors—in compliance with current law, the
charity then issues each donor a receipt stating the charity provided ―no
goods or services‖ in return for the donation.152
B. Proposal Is Consistent with Charitable Tax Policies
Scholars endorse multiple rationales for the charitable tax deduction,
and this subpart analyzes whether this Article‘s fundamental claim is in
accord with each rationale. Professor Atkinson asserts that if we adopt
the Platonic approach and suppose there is a single unifying feature for
the descriptive term charitable,153 we commit the fallacy of ―the one true
way.‖154 Instead, Professor Atkinson and others assert that charitable
tax rules are a ―complex phenomenon‖155 that reflect a more holistic
approach recognizing multiple policies that in combination may justify a
philanthropist‘s tax deduction depending upon the presence or absence

id. at 81–83.
150. See supra notes 121–23 and accompanying text (stating that many charities adopt the
―multiple of two‖ pricing scheme to ensure that all will know who made the top gift, and how the other
donors rank on the ladder of generosity).
151. See BURTON, supra note 15, at 139–52.
152. See I.R.C. § 170(f)(8)(B)(ii) (2006) (requiring that a donor must receive a contemporaneous
written acknowledgment from the charity which states whether the charity provided any goods or
services in return for the contribution to claim a charitable deduction); see also I.R.C. § 6115(b) (2006)
(requiring that the charity provide a receipt if the amount exceeds $75 and the payment was ―partly as a
contribution and partly in consideration for goods or services provided . . . .‖).
153. Rob Atkinson, Theories of the Federal Income Tax Exemption for Charities: Thesis,
Antithesis, and Syntheses, 27 STETSON L. REV. 395, 399 (1997) (stating that with a Platonic view, the
anticipated single feature ―is the essence of . . . ‗charitability‘‖).
154. Id. at 400; see also id. at 399 (―Modern philosophers have questioned the adequacy of [the
Platonic] account of description, pointing out that things described by the same term can bear a family
resemblance to one another even though all members of the class do not share a single common
characteristic.‖).
155. Id. at 401; Gergen, supra note 5, at 1394; Colombo, supra note 11, at 662.
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of various features.156
Erudite scribes offer four major rationales. First, the altruism
rationale157 posits that a true definition of charity involves ―selfless love
of others,‖158 and a tax deduction to promote this virtuous behavior is
appropriate.159 Although the tax laws often seek to promote specific
types of behavior160 and altruistic generosity is praiseworthy, 161 critics
persuasively argue that the altruism theory founders as the exclusive
theoretical platform for designing an ideal charitable tax deduction.162
As a practical matter, even if some people act altruistically some of the
time,163 ―developing an administrable legal test that could accurately
isolate donations which are selflessly motivated . . . would be practically
impossible.‖164 Even the theory‘s chief proponent concedes that
because charity ―is a matter primarily of the heart . . . in seeking a legal
definition in objective terms, we are bound to be disappointed.‖165
Moreover, many social scientists forcefully assert that donors are not
altruistic, and instead are self-interested rational actors.166 For example,
evolutionary psychologists posit that the drive to reproduce and
perpetuate our genes motivates much human behavior.
These
156. Atkinson, supra note 153, at 425; id. at 399 (suggesting that instead of sharing a single
unifying feature, transactions worthy of charitable tax benefits share a ―gestalt or family resemblance‖);
see also Gergen, supra note 5, at 1394 (―examin[ing] three theories supporting some form of a
deduction or tax credit for contributions‖); Colombo, supra note 11, at 662 (examining ―several
different rationales for the charitable contribution deduction‖).
157. Atkinson, supra note 153, at 423–24 (discussing ―Atkinson‘s altruism theory‖); see also Rob
Atkinson, Altruism in Nonprofit Organizations, 31 B.C. L. REV. 501, 599–600 (1990).
158. Atkinson, supra note 153, at 401.
159. Gergen, supra note 5, at 1395.
160. The tax law is ―replete with . . . provisions aimed at inducing certain kinds of behavior . . . .‖
Colombo, supra note 11, at 668.
161. TIBOR R. MACHAN, GENEROSITY: VIRTUE IN CIVIL SOCIETY ix (1998) (―Generosity is a
moral virtue.‖); id. at 1 (―No direct personal gain is involved in generous conduct.‖).
162. Posner, supra note 7, at 574 (―[A]ltruism does not supply a satisfactory explanation of
philanthropic giving. It does not explain why people do not decrease their giving as a charity becomes
wealthier, [or] why large gifts are conveyed in a highly public way.‖).
163. Despite his criticisms, Professor Colombo does not rule out the chance that people ―act
altruistically from time to time.‖ Colombo, supra note 11, at 669.
164. Id.
165. Atkinson, supra note 153, at 401.
166. See Colombo, supra note 11, at 669 (observing that ―[t]here is a great debate within the
social sciences . . . over whether ‗unselfish [behavior]‘ actually exists‖).
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psychologists view charitable giving as a means to ―help[] other
organisms to reproduce which are likely to carry the same
genes . . . [and as a means of inducing] reciprocal altruism.‖167
Economists point to the various donor benefits including improved
public image, enhanced self-image, the ―warm glow,‖168 and other
personal benefits, to deduce that philanthropists donate when they gain
by giving.169 Social psychologists surmise that charitable patrons feel a
natural empathy when they see members of the same species in distress
and use charitable giving to assuage their mental turmoil and avoid
guilt.170
Although it may not function as the exclusive fountainhead of the
charitable tax deduction, the altruism theory may help explain the
availability of a deduction in some situations. Judges and regulators
likely desire to promote virtue or wish to be perceived as promoting
virtue.171
In regards to whether this Article‘s suggestion is consistent with the
altruism rationale of allowing the deduction for selfless transfers, it is
noted that ―human motivation is terribly complex,‖172 and naming
donors‘ motivations vary. Nevertheless, naming arrangements may
reflect, at least in some situations and to some extent, selfishness, ego,
and pride173 when compared to anonymous gifts which are more likely
the progeny of selfless love.174 This Article‘s approach would tend to
encourage anonymous giving by reducing the tax deduction for named
167. Id. at 673–74.
168. Id.
169. Id.; see infra Part III.E.1 (discussing the warm glow and various other nonmonetary personal
benefits).
170. See Colombo, supra note 11, at 675–76.
171. See Kelman, supra note 9, at 880 (―Even the most sincere altruist buys the scarce resource of
looking altruistic.‖); see also Colombo, supra note 11, at 669 (noting that some of the people may act
altruistically some of the time).
172. Colombo, supra note 11, at 669; Stone, supra note 10, at 231 (―The psychology and
economics of charitable giving by individuals is a difficult and hotly debated topic.‖).
173. See infra Part III.A.1.b (discussing the potential benefits to the donor from a naming rights
arrangement). But see infra notes 257–61 and accompanying text (observing that some philanthropists,
particularly celebrities, may allow their largesse to be publicized to help the charity‘s fundraising
efforts).
174. But see infra Part III.E.1 (suggesting that substantial benefits can result from philanthropy
even in the absence of naming rights).
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gifts. Consequently its claim is in harmony with the altruism theory.
The second major rationale considered in this subpart is the subsidy
theory, which is ―[f]irst in importance in the literature‖175 and is
described as ―orthodoxy.‖176 Under this theory, the charitable deduction
subsidizes, and thereby encourages, donations to charities that provide
societal benefits.177 The theory asserts that without the tax deduction,
the public will donate at a suboptimal level. Taxpayers will not have
sufficient incentives to donate because the charity‘s activities may not
benefit the donors, and instead may benefit people who do not
contribute, commonly called ―free riders.‖178 The charitable tax
deduction grants donors a tax break, and charges the free riders, and
everyone else, higher taxes.179
An example involving a disaster relief organization, such as the Red
Cross, helps demonstrate the theory. The Red Cross provides socially
beneficial services, but individuals may have insufficient incentives to
donate without a tax benefit. A person who donates to the Red Cross
may never be a disaster victim. On the other hand, people who never
donate may become disaster victims. These victims may receive direct
services from the Red Cross because the Red Cross does not
discriminate when providing services. As a result, economically, each
individual has an incentive to refrain from contributing and freely ride
on the generosity of others.180 The subsidy theory posits that this free175. Gergen, supra note 5, at 1394; see also id. at 1396 (―To encourage giving is to this day the
major rationale for a deduction.‖); see also Halperin, supra note 138, at 4 (―Most observers justify the
charitable deduction as an incentive to encourage taxpayers to increase their contributions to charity.‖).
176. Ilan Benshalom, The Dual Subsidy Theory of Charitable Deductions, 84 IND. L.J. 1047, 1050
(2009); see also Colombo, supra note 11, at 661 (The I.R.C. § ―170(c) deduction is best explained as an
indirect government subsidy to charitable organizations . . . the existing literature . . . generally accepts
the subsidization role of the deduction.‖); see also id. at 682 (referring to this as ―the most widely
accepted rationale‖).
177. Colombo, supra note 11, at 662 (observing that under the subsidy theory the charitable
contribution deduction is ―simply an auxiliary subsidy for exempt organizations rather than . . . a standalone provision with a separate theoretical basis‖); see also Atkinson, supra note 153, at 397 (―[T]he
conventional wisdom [is that charitable tax benefits] subsidize[] the social benefits charities provide.‖).
178. Benshalom, supra note 176, at 1050; see Atkinson, supra note 153, at 406 (discussing classic
examples of organizations providing benefits to free-riders such as listener-supported radio, community
development organizations, and organizations dedicated to enhance environmental quality); see also
Colombo, supra note 11, at 686 (discussing basic scientific research).
179. See Gergen, supra note 5, at 1403.
180. Atkinson, supra note 153, at 405 (―[N]onprofits produce what economists call public goods,

https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol80/iss1/2

28

Drennan: WHERE GENEROSITY AND PRIDE ABIDE: CHARITABLE NAMING RIGHTS

2011]

WHERE GENEROSITY AND PRIDE ABIDE

81

rider problem will leave disaster relief organizations under-funded, and
to compensate, the tax system should entice possible donors with a
deduction.181
In the case of a naming rights arrangement, with respect to the part of
the transfer equal to the value of the naming rights, the charity
adequately compensates the philanthropist. As a result, no government
subsidy is necessary for that part. Professor Gergen confirms that no
charitable tax deduction is justified under the subsidy theory if a
―group . . . has sufficient incentive to fund the good at an optimal level
without a deduction for its payments.‖182 This Article‘s claim is
consonant with the subsidy rationale because the charitable tax
deduction is available for the gift portion of a philanthropist‘s transfer
but not for the portion that purchases a naming right.
Third, the ―proper measure of disposable income‖183 rationale posits
that taxable income should include only annual earnings available for
―personal consumption.‖184 Whether this Article‘s proposal is consistent
with this rationale depends on whether the focus is on the philanthropist
or on the charity‘s beneficiaries. Focusing on the former, arguably the
philanthropist has purchased a valuable return benefit, and he enjoyed
personal consumption. Thus, no tax deduction is appropriate for the
naming portion of the transfer to charity. 185 On the other hand, if one
goods the enjoyment of which cannot effectively be limited to those who pay and which thus are
unlikely to be produced in optimal quantities by for-profit firms.‖).
181. Gergen, supra note 5, at 1403 (observing that the charitable deduction ―enables people with a
high preference for a [charitable] good to shift some of [the] cost to low-preference freeriders‖ by
forcing everyone to pay higher taxes).
182. Id. at 1412; see also id. at 1438 (questioning tax deductions for contributing churchgoers and
viewer-contributors of public television).
183. See Peter J. Wiedenbeck, Charitable Contributions: A Policy Perspective, 50 MO. L. REV.
85, 88 (1985); see also Gergen, supra note 5, at 1394, (citing Andrews, supra note 9, at 309).
184. Wiedenbeck, supra note 183, at 87 n.14 (―[P]ersonal income [is the] sum of . . . [personal]
consumption and [accumulation,] and [] the change in value of the store of property rights between the
beginning and end of the period in question.‖) (quoting HENRY SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION
50 (1938)); see also Andrews, supra note 9, at 313. Traditionally the definition of income includes
resources available for both consumption and savings, but in the case of a charitable donation the
taxpayer cannot save the resources because the taxpayer has paid the resources to the charity. Colombo,
supra note 11, at 680. This leaves only the consumption element to consider.
185. See supra Part III.A.1; Colombo, supra note 11, at 680 (―Transactions that involve direct
quid pro quo unquestionably involve private preclusive appropriation of resources.‖) (internal quotations
omitted).
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focuses on the charity‘s beneficiaries, they will benefit from
(consume)186 the naming part just as much as the gift part, and the
naming philanthropist should deduct the entire transfer to charity
because the charity‘s beneficiaries consume those amounts.
The redistribution theory is closely aligned with the proper measure
of disposable income rationale. It maintains that the tax system should
reward donors who voluntarily distribute resources for the ultimate
benefit of a charity‘s beneficiaries who will be poor or otherwise in
need.187 Again, this Article‘s proposal is consistent with the theory if
one focuses on the philanthropist‘s acquisition of the naming rights but
not if one focuses on the benefits to the charity‘s beneficiaries.
Fourth, the pluralism theory stresses that a charitable deduction can
admirably facilitate the efforts of a passionate minority striving to
pursue bold social goals through the charitable sector.188 In our
democratic society, arguably the views of the majority direct public
funds, and autonomous mavericks with salutary, but minority views
cannot direct tax revenues.189 ―[C]haritable relief . . . allows taxpayers
to speak while avoiding the bureaucratic shortcoming[s] of government
spending, [and] the deduction for charitable giving ―promotes a more
defused and pluralistic way of spending public funds.‖ 190 Critics
counter that the charitable deduction provides excessive power to
wealthy philanthropists to shape social policy. 191 In any event,
186. See Andrews, supra note 9, at 347 (supporting the view that because the funds are no longer
available to the wealthy donor for consumption, under this theory the donor should deduct the amount);
see also Gergen, supra note 5, at 1415 (―Gifts to charity [are not] consumption because they do not
divert resources to [the donor‘s] private use.‖).
187. See Gergen, supra note 5, at 1408; id. at 1394 (―[A charitable] deduction equitably accounts
for the loss in welfare suffered by people who transfer their resources to charity.‖); Miranda Perry
Fleischer, Theorizing the Charitable Tax Subsidies: The Role of Distributive Justice, 87 WASH. U. L.
REV. 505 (2010).
188. See Saul Levmore, Taxes as Ballots, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 387 (1998); Benshalom, supra note
176, at 1050; Gergen, supra note 5, at 1395 (noting that ―charity is a high form of self-expression
deserving encouragement‖).
189. Benshalom, supra note 176, at 1047–48 (―[C]haritable spending [voices] preferences not
accounted for by the majoritarian process . . . [and the charitable] subsidy . . . supplements the
shortcomings of majority decision making.‖).
190. Id. at 1050; id. at 1047 (noting that the charitable tax deduction ―decentraliz[es] the provision
of public goods [and] allows individual donors to direct public funds while bypassing majority
approval‖).
191. Gergen, supra note 5, at 1405–406 (―The use of a deduction to provide tax relief is
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eliminating the deduction for the naming portion should not impede
philanthropic mavericks because they are free to donate anonymously
and deduct the full amounts they transfer to charity.
C. Addressing IRS Arguments
In 1968, the IRS proclaimed that donors can deduct the full amount
transferred to charity regardless of any public recognition received.192
In effect, the IRS allows charities and donors to value naming rights at
zero.
The IRS provided no detailed explanation for its decision, but the
rulings briefly refer to three justifications.193 First, the IRS stated
―[s]uch privileges as being associated with or being known as a
benefactor . . . are not significant return benefits . . . .‖194 While the
public recognition likely will be trivial when the transfer to charity is
comparatively miniscule, as when a donor‘s name is listed along with
hundreds of others in an alumni newsletter,195 notable naming rights can
have significant value for the reasons discussed in Part III.A.1.
Second, in 1968, the IRS stated that ―being known as a
benefactor . . . [has no] monetary value . . . ‖196 In 1968 naming rights
for a building or charitable fund would have been especially difficult to
monetize because of the lack of activity in both the charitable naming
rights market and the commercial facilities naming market. But things
have changed in forty years. The markets for naming rights have
expanded exponentially. Charities collect approximately $4 billion

particularly troublesome because it makes it cheaper for high-bracket taxpayers to give . . . . [This]
system . . . removes power from the majority and revests it in wealthy donors.‖); Colombo, supra note
11, at 685 (stating that this system ―skews the influence of big donors‖).
192. Rev. Rul. 68-432, 1968-2 C.B. 104 (―Such privileges as being associated with or being
known as a benefactor of the organization are not significant return benefits that have a monetary
value . . . .‖).
193. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 77-367, 1977-2 C.B. 193; Rev. Rul. 73-407, 1973-2 C.B. 383; Rev. Rul.
68-432, 1968-2 C.B. 104.
194. Rev. Rul. 68-432, 1968-2 C.B. 104 (emphasis added).
195. This Article‘s proposal would not apply to this type of evanescent public recognition. See
Appendix A.
196. Rev. Rul. 68-432, 1968-2 C.B. 104.

Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2012

31

University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 80, Iss. 1 [2012], Art. 2

84

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 80

annually in naming transfers,197 and consultants stand willing and able to
establish ask amounts for charitable naming rights.198 Also, as discussed
in Part III.D.3, data on sales of naming and related rights for
professional sports arenas indicates that naming rights are valuable, and
many consultants now specialize in estimating the commercial value of
naming rights and associated rights.199
Third, the IRS has stated that public recognition is ―incidental to
making the organization function.‖200 Generally, a benefit to a donor is
incidental if it naturally flows from the organization‘s operations. 201
For example, if a donor contributes to a museum to build a new exhibit
hall, the donor‘s ability to visit the completed exhibit hall will be an
incidental benefit to the donor. As part of its charitable mission, the
museum likely allows members of the general public to visit; the
donor‘s opportunity to visit the new exhibit hall is a benefit, but it is a
minor benefit that occurs as a natural consequence of the museum‘s
open-door policy.
Notable naming rights do not appear to fall within the normal
description of incidental. In connection with major capital campaigns,
charities identify naming opportunities,202 engage paid experts to help
197. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
198. See, e.g., How Much Are Naming Rights Worth?, NONPROFIT EDGE (DeLeon & Stang,
Gaithersburg, M.D.) Sept. 2009, available at http://www.deleonandstang.com/news-articles/nonprofitedge-article/how-much-are-naming-rights-worth/; Major Gifts Research Centre, DIG IN RESEARCH,
http://diginresearch.biz/references.html (last visited Oct. 2, 2011) (discussing ―emerging trends in
[charitable] naming opportunities‖); Ann Goldman, Magic Number: How to Ask for the “Right” Gift,
FRONT RANGE SOURCE (Nov. 10, 2010), http://www.frontrangesource.com/the-magic-number-ask-forthe-%E2%80%9Cright%E2%80%99-amount; see also BURTON, supra note 15, at xi (stating that Dig In
Research helps charities develop marketing strategies for selling naming rights, in particular ―defining
their inventory of named properties and setting the ask amounts for naming rights‖).
199. See, e.g., Jim Harris, What’s in a Name?, ARK. BUS., Oct. 11, 2010, at 28, available at 2010
WLNR 21078353 (discussing Turner Sponsorship Consultants); Jim Bentubo, Colleges Forgoing
Millions
in
Naming-Rights
Deals,
SPORTS
BUS.
DAILY
(Aug.
31,
2007),
http:www.sportsbusinessdaily.com/article/114626 (regarding Front Row Marketing and Wasserman
Media Group Marketing); Chris Poynter, $40 million may be high for naming of new arena, COURIER J.
(Louisville, KY), Sept. 11, 2005, at A1, available at 2005 WLNR 26774540 (discussing the Bonham
Group, ―a Denver company that negotiates and tracks naming-rights deals‖).
200. Rev. Rul. 68-432, 1968-2 C.B. 104.
201. See Rev. Rul. 80-77, 1980-1 C.B. 56 (a taxpayer may deduct the full amount she transferred
to the Girl Scouts of America even though her daughter is a girl scout); see also Rev. Rul. 81-307, 19812 C.B. 78; Rev. Rul. 67-446, 1967-2 C.B. 119.
202. See BURTON, supra note 15, at 134.
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determine the ask amounts, and develop elaborate marketing
strategies.203 Rather than being incidental, naming rights are contrived
and seem to unnaturally clutter the charitable landscape.204
The government formulated its approach in 1968, before the
explosion of charitable naming rights in the 1990s.205 Because naming
rights were comparatively rare in 1968, the government in 1968 may
have rationally chosen to pursue other tax inequities at that time. With
the changes in the charitable market, reevaluation is appropriate.
D. Implementation Options; Parsing Based on Commercial Value
There are at least three options for implementing this Article‘s claim
that naming philanthropists receive a valuable return benefit and the tax
law should restrict the charitable deduction: (1) prohibit any deduction
when a donor acquires significant naming rights; (2) apply a uniform
fraction approach to calculate the naming portion and prohibit a
deduction for that portion, or (3) design a fair market value approach
that estimates the value of the particular naming rights, and prohibits a
deduction for that portion of the philanthropist‘s transfer to charity. The
third option should come closest to achieving horizontal equity, 206 but
the uniform fraction approach might be a viable backup if the fair
market value approach poses excessive administrative costs.
1. Rejecting Total Disallowance
A total disallowance rule finds support in the legislative history for
the charitable deduction,207 but would be excessively harsh. A naming

203. See Gergen, supra note 5, at 1409.
204. See Isherwood, supra note 29, § 2, at 6.
205. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
206. See supra note 140 and accompanying text (describing horizontal equity as treating similarly
situated taxpayers the same).
207. S. REP. NO. 1622, at 196 (1954), reprinted in 1954 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4629; H.R. REP. NO. 1337
(1954), reprinted in 1954 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4017, 4180 (providing that no charitable deduction is available
if the donor expects a substantial financial return benefit); see also Staples v. Comm‘r, 821 F.2d 1324,
1326 (8th Cir. 1987), vacated, 490 U.S. 1103 (1989), and abrogated by Hernandez v. Comm‘r, 490 U.S.
680 (1989) (discussing the legislative history).
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donor makes the quintessential ―dual character‖208 payment, and the
lion‘s share of the naming transfer likely is a bona fide, generous gift. 209
A complete disallowance rule would fail to acknowledge this generosity.
In addition, a draconian disallowance rule could trigger devious
gamesmanship210 by philanthropists resulting in excessive enforcement
costs.
2. Fair Market Value Approach
In implementing this Article‘s claim, the best method for advancing
horizontal equity211 is to allow a charitable deduction only for the
philanthropist‘s transfer in excess of the fair market value of the naming
rights. Existing law applies this method for other return benefits 212 and
would provide a framework even if the government enacts no special
statutory or regulatory provisions to address naming rights. For
charitable contribution purposes, fair market value is the price at which
property would change hands between a hypothetical willing buyer and
a hypothetical willing seller, both with reasonable knowledge of the
relevant facts, and neither being under a compulsion to act.213 For tax
purposes, property is valued at its ―highest and best use‖214 and ―is not
affected by whether the owner has actually put the property to its highest
and best use. The realistic objective potential uses for property control
the valuation.‖215

208. United States v. Am. Bar Endowment, 477 U.S. 105, 117 (1986) (describing a ―dual
character‖ payment as a purchase and a contribution).
209. See infra Part III.D.3 and Appendix B.
210. Charities and donors might engage in reciprocal or circuitous multi-step transactions. For
example, multiple donors might collude to allow each donor to contribute to one charity while enjoying
a naming right from another. Any proposal will need to prevent machinations, but a total disallowance
rule would encourage aggressive behavior.
211. See supra note 140 (describing horizontal equity).
212. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
213. Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-1(c)(2) (as amended in 2008); Treas. Reg. § 1.6115-1(a)(1) (1996).
But see Turner v. Comm‘r, 13 T.C.M. (CCH) 462 (1954) (presenting unique facts in which the court
declines to use the ―retail value‖ of property, refers to the ―value to the [taxpayer],‖ and chooses an
amount between the two figures).
214. Stanley Works v. Comm‘r, 87 T.C. 389, 400 (1986).
215. Consol. Investors Grp. v. Comm‘r, 98 T.C.M. (CCH) 601 (2009).
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In general, when a charity provides a significant216 return benefit, the
charity must disclose the return benefit to the donor 217 and provide a
―good faith estimate of the value‖218 of the return benefit to the donor.
Treasury Regulations state that the charity can use any reasonable
method to value the return benefit if used in good faith. 219 The charity
provides the good faith estimate on a contemporaneous written
acknowledgment delivered to the donor, and the donor may follow the
charity‘s estimate unless the donor knows or has reason to know that the
charity‘s estimate is unreasonable.220
Thus, the IRS could adopt a fair market value approach by repealing
its administrative pronouncements that effectively value naming rights
at zero221 and by applying the general rules. In addition, a de minimis
exception excludes insignificant return benefits given in fundraising
campaigns.222 These rules ignore a return benefit if the cost to the
charity is $9.70 or less (in 2011)223 and the value of the benefit is less
than $97.00 (in 2011) (both figures are adjusted for inflation).224 This
existing exception would exclude many small naming rights
arrangements.225 Donors who merely name a brick in the sidewalk or
similar item likely could continue to deduct one hundred percent of their
transfers to charity, notwithstanding the receipt of the naming rights.
Although the IRS could independently subject naming rights to the
216. See infra notes 223–224 and accompanying text (disregarding insubstantial return benefits).
217. I.R.C. §§ 170(f)(8)(B)(ii), 6115(a) (2006) (providing that if the charity receives a quid pro
quo donation in excess of $75 and fails to provide an acknowledgement to the donor, the charity is liable
for a monetary penalty of $10 per statement with a maximum penalty of $5,000 per fundraising event or
mailing); see also I.R.C. § 6714(a) (2006).
218. I.R.C. §§ 170(f)(8)(B)(iii), 6115(a)(2) (2006); Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-13(f)(2)(iii) (as
amended in 1996).
219. Treas. Reg. § 1.6115-1(a)(1) (1996); see also Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-13(f)(7) (as amended in
1996) (explaining that whether the charity provides the estimate in good faith is determined ―without
regard to the manner in which the [charity] in fact made the estimate‖).
220. Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-1(h)(4) (1996); Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-13(f)(7)(1996).
221. See supra Part II.A (discussing the government authorities that effectively value public
recognition at zero).
222. Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-13(f)(8)–(9) (as amended in 1996); Rev. Proc. 90-12, 1990-1 C.B. 471,
472.
223. Rev. Proc. 2010-40, 2010-46 I.R.B. 663, 666, § 3.16(2).
224. Id.
225. Rev. Proc. 90-12, 1990-1 C.B. 471 (allowing charities and their donors to disregard certain
token or insignificant benefits).
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general rules, congressional modifications would be appropriate to
accommodate special concerns with naming rights.
a. Proposed Focus on Commercial Value of Advertising Impressions
If the IRS changed its administrative position and required charities
and philanthropists to value naming rights without legislative
adjustments, significant practical problems would arise.
As a
preliminary matter, the value of charitable naming rights cannot be
isolated merely by focusing on the ask amounts and the actual amounts
transferred with respect to comparable properties.
A preferred method of valuation is frequently the market value
method in which the appraiser identifies recent sales of comparable
rights and then adjusts those sale prices to estimate the value of the
subject rights.226 Appraisers, researchers, and consultants can research
the ask amounts and actual transfer amounts.227 In the charitable
market, however, the sale of the naming rights is intertwined with
generosity, and neither charities nor philanthropists have sufficient
incentives to unbundle the naming rights as a separate commodity.
From the charity‘s standpoint, the current system of negotiating with the
benefactor for naming rights and then proclaiming that the benefactor‘s
total transfer to the charity is an unrequited gift 228 is extremely lucrative.
It allows charities to base the ask amount on its own construction costs
and in many cases collect fifty percent of the construction costs from a
single naming donor.229 Outside the charitable sector, in the world of
professional sports arena naming, the owner‘s construction costs are

226. See Greg C. Ashley & Michael J. O‘Hara, Valuing Naming Rights, 2, UNIV. OF NEB. OMAHA
(Aug. 8, 2001), http://cba.unomaha.edu/faculty/mohara/web/ALSB01ValuingNamingRights.pdf (―The
lynchpin of valuation is comparable transactions . . . [but] [w]ith regard to naming rights, it is important
to note that no two deals are the same.‖); Bill Gerrard, Milena M. Parent & Trevor Slack, What Drives
the Value of Stadium Naming Rights? A Hedonic-Pricing Approach to the Valuation of Sporting
Intangible Assets, 2 INT‘L J. SPORT FIN. 10, 12 (2007) (relying on a ―benchmark anchor-and-adjustment
method[] in which the recent market valuations of similar assets are used as an ‗anchor‘ or ‗benchmark‘
valuation that is adjusted to take account of asset-specific factors‖).
227. See, e.g., supra notes 71–76 and accompanying text (discussing Dig In Research‘s extensive
nationwide study of charitable naming rights).
228. See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
229. See infra note 275.
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irrelevant in the negotiations.230 As the data in Appendix B indicates,
the facility owner of a pro sports venue may receive payments from the
name buyer worth only from four percent to approximately twenty-five
percent of the construction costs.
Likewise philanthropists do not want charities to separate naming
rights from generosity. Professor Posner observes that if charities
customarily sold naming rights to the highest bidder, charitable naming
rights would lose their luster and would no longer signal that the name
holders are virtuous benefactors.231 As a result, the charitable naming
rights market is a complex junction of generosity and pride.
Because the ask amount in a charitable naming arrangement does not
equal the value of the naming right, an appraiser seeking to value
naming rights might consult a different market232 such as for pro sports
arena naming rights. But that data is not perfect either. The amounts
paid for naming rights of sports arenas typically are bundled with the
purchase of other commercial rights. Although the parties involved
frequently do not disclose all the details, 233 researchers report that the
price quoted publicly for the naming rights often encompasses many
other valuable rights, including but not limited to, the right to: (1)

230. GORDON V. SMITH & RUSSELL L. PARR, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: VALUATION,
EXPLOITATION, AND INFRINGEMENT DAMAGES 63 (2005) (―The cost of putting together such a contract
and the cost of the facility involved are both irrelevant to the value of the deal.‖); DeSchriver & Jensen,
supra note 133, at 361 (―[W]e also find that the price for facility naming rights is independent of . . . the
cost of construction.‖).
231. Posner, supra note 7, at 574 (―The reason that universities do not simply sell titles and
positions is that their prestige would be destroyed if they were routinely sold . . . to the highest
bidder . . . . [P]eople value reputations for generosity . . . but if one could purchase such reputations,
then they would cease to exist.‖). Naming rights signal that the charity approves of the naming donor.
This implicit approval feature was evident when Seton Hall University removed the name of disgraced
Tyco CEO Dennis Kozlowski from its business school after his criminal conviction. Larry Gordon,
When the Name on the Building Is Mud, L.A. TIMES, July 11, 2008, at 1, available at 2008 WLNR
13001702; see also Emily S. Achenbaum, Levine Good Example of a Donor Gone Bad; Zoo Takes His
Name Off Polar Bear Exhibit, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 17, 2008, at Metro Zone NS 1.
232. Nancy J. Knauer, The Paradox of Corporate Giving: Tax Expenditures, the Nature of the
Corporation, and the Social Construction of Charity, 44 DEPAUL L. REV. 1, 81 (1994) (questioning
whether corporations have altruistic motives when making contributions to charity). But see DeSchriver
& Jensen, supra note 133, at 361 (mentioning that some commercial firms may have community
motives).
233. Gerrard, Parent & Slack, supra note 226, at 15.
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operate concession stands (sometimes called ―pouring rights‖ 234); (2) the
right to purchase, or use without additional consideration, preferred
seating for the company‘s executives and its best customers; and (3) the
exclusive right to sell its products to the team and building owners.235
As a result, the amounts publicly quoted for pro sports naming rights
likely overstate the price for the naming rights alone.
Nevertheless, part of the process236 used to estimate the value of pro
sports arena naming rights could be employed to estimate the value of
charitable naming rights. In sports-naming deals, experts frequently
analyze the ―ad impressions‖237 generated. ―[T]he fundamental value of
[naming rights] depends primarily on the . . . advertising messages
generated . . . .‖238 Potential ad impressions can occur from a variety of
sources, including (1) direct advertising by the named institution itself;
(2) direct impressions received by people present at the facility; (3)
―[m]iscellaneous non-paid mentions in newscasts and articles;‖ (4) TV,
radio, and other media coverage of events or programs at the facility; (5)
passing pedestrians and automobile traffic; (6) ―direct view from area
buildings;‖ and (7) ―word-of-mouth.‖239
Appraisers then consider the cost of generating ad impressions from
other platforms such as television, radio, or newspaper to calculate the
value of the naming rights based on the cost to secure the same number
and value of ad impressions from other sources.240 Appraisers have
234. Ashley & O‘Hara, supra note 226, at 13.
235. Id. at 12 (―Naming rights deals usually include more, often much more, than just the right to
have a name placed on a building.‖); see also id. at 13 (listing twenty-seven different types of added
benefits provided with arena naming rights); Gerrard, Parent & Slack, supra note 226, at 11.
236. See Ashley & O‘Hara, supra note 226, at 15–16 (discussing different methods to appraise
naming rights, including a cost method, an income method, and a market value method); Gerrard, Parent
& Slack, supra note 226, at 10 (―adopt[ing] a multi-attribute hedonic-pricing benchmark valuation
approach to the determination of the observed market value of stadium naming rights‖); Harris, supra
note 199, at 2B (stating that a consultant claims to have a proprietary method for valuing naming rights).
237. Ashley & O‘Hara, supra note 226, at 18.
238. Gerrard, Parent & Slack, supra note 226 at 11; Ashley & O‘Hara, supra note 226, at 18
(―[S]ome of the naming rights literature suggests that ad impressions are the primary value driver in a
naming rights deal.‖).
239. Ashley & O‘Hara, supra note 226, at 18.
240. Id. at 17 (referring to this as the ―cost method‖ of valuing the naming rights); SMITH & PARR,
supra note 230, at 65 (describing this approach as an ―income method‖ of valuation). But see Ashley &
O‘Hara, supra note 226, at 15 (discussing other methods of valuation).
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developed various conversion ratios. For example one group has
determined that ―four signage-generated impressions are needed to equal
the effect of one radio-generated impression.‖241
Charitable naming rights also provide ad impressions, and
commercial firms likely would buy those ad impressions in the absence
of higher bids from philanthropic individuals.242 Thus, a possible
simplification could involve permitting charities and philanthropists to
value charitable naming rights based on the amount a reasonable
commercial buyer acting at arm‘s length would pay for the ad
impressions from the charitable naming rights. This would isolate the
value of the naming right as an advertising opportunity from the halo
effect or other impacts unique to charitable arrangements.243 This
simplification would conform to an established IRS principle. When a
taxpayer receives a return benefit for a charitable contribution, in
reducing the taxpayer‘s charitable deduction for the value of the return
benefit, the IRS refuses to consider the taxpayer‘s unique enjoyment of
the return benefit.244 For example, if a taxpayer contributes and receives
a ticket for a concert or a dinner, the taxpayer can deduct only the
amount given in excess of the value of the concert or dinner ticket as
determined in an arm‘s-length sale between a hypothetical willing buyer
and willing seller. This is true even if the taxpayer does not wish to
attend the concert or the dinner and, in fact, fails to attend.245 Appendix
A of this Article sets forth a proposed statute implementing a special
valuation rule for charitable naming rights.
241. Ashley & O‘Hara, supra note 226, at 18.
242. See, e.g., Will Connaghan, St. Louis to Host Supreme Visits this Month, DAILY REC. (St.
Louis, Mo.), Feb. 1, 2007, available at 2007 WLNR 26366085 (demonstrating that on some occasions
commercial firms acquire naming rights to charitable structures; referring to the law school at
Washington University in St. Louis, Missouri named ―Anheuser-Busch Hall‖); see also supra note 34
and accompanying text (discussing Bill Gates‘ acquisition of naming rights over the Stanford University
computer center).
243. See Stone, supra note 10, at 215 (―[E]lucidat[ing] the conceptual distinction between selling
sponsorships and selling advertising–between leasing halos and billboards.‖).
244. Rev. Rul. 67-246, 1967-2 C.B. 104 (explaining that the value of tickets or other privileges
provided to a philanthropist in connection with a fundraising event will reduce the philanthropist‘s
charitable deduction even if the philanthropist does not use, utilize, or exercise the privileges).
245. Id. (determining value based on an arm‘s-length sale between a hypothetical willing buyer
and willing seller without considering whether the taxpayer actually will attend the concert or the
dinner).

Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2012

39

University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 80, Iss. 1 [2012], Art. 2

92

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 80

b. Expanded Exception for Insubstantial Rights
This Article‘s proposal would impose administrative burdens on
charities. Without further adjustment, charities would need to make a
good faith value estimate even for minor naming rights provided as part
of a capital campaign.246 Charities might need to estimate the value of
naming rights for relatively minor items such as a tree, a park bench, or
a window. The current de minimis threshold allows the parties to ignore
a return benefit only if the cost to the charity is below the threshold
($9.70 in 2011) or less, and the value of the benefit is less than the
threshold ($97.00 in 2011) (both figures are adjusted for inflation).247
Another potential modification of existing law could shelter certain
small naming rights arrangements that exceed the current de minimis
threshold. Existing charitable deduction laws employ an amazing
number of threshold figures, including $250, $500, $5,000, $20,000, and
$500,000.248 Adding a new threshold specifically for naming rights
would not substantially increase the law‘s complexity. As an example,
Congress could direct the Treasury Department to issue regulations
increasing the ―insubstantial benefit‖ exception ten fold when applied to
charitable naming rights. Allowing the exception for naming rights that
cost the charity $97.00 or less and which have a value of $970.00 or less
could significantly reduce the potential administrative burdens.
Appendix A includes sample statutory language implementing this
modification.
c. Advantages of the Fair Market Value Approach
In addition to improving horizontal equity,249 eliminating the naming
rights exception should have other positive ramifications. It would
address the anomaly that the benefactor bargains vociferously over the

246. See I.R.C. § 170(f)(8)(B) (2006) (requiring the charity, generally, to provide a ―good faith
estimate of the value of any goods or services‖ given in consideration of a charitable donation).
247. See supra notes 223–224 and accompany text.
248. See generally Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-13 (as amended in 1996); KIRSCHTEN & FREITAG, supra
note 90, § VI-C(1)–(4) (discussing the $250, $500, $5,000, and $500,000 thresholds); see also id. at A182 (discussing the $20,000 threshold).
249. See supra note 140 and accompanying text.

https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol80/iss1/2

40

Drennan: WHERE GENEROSITY AND PRIDE ABIDE: CHARITABLE NAMING RIGHTS

2011]

WHERE GENEROSITY AND PRIDE ABIDE

93

extent of the naming rights, while the charity proclaims that the
benefactor‘s entire transfer to charity was a gift. 250 Similarly it will free
the charity‘s fundraisers from the current duplicity of courting donors
with valuable naming rights and then treating the total transfer as pure
generosity.251 Likewise it frees charities, some of our most revered
institutions, from issuing receipts to donors which boldly proclaim that
the charity provided ―no goods or services . . . in connection with‖ the
donor‘s contribution252 when the parties bargained ardently about the
extent of the naming rights. Also, eliminating the exception may
improve public perception of the tax rules, thereby helping voluntary
compliance.253
d. Disadvantages of the Fair Market Value Approach
Even with the simplifying modifications proposed in this Article,
employing the fair market value approach may involve substantial costs.
For example, charities will need to state a good faith estimate of the
value of the return benefits on the written acknowledgements provided
to donors.254 Charities may wish to hire valuation experts, particularly
for the first few fundraising campaigns, to confidently estimate the
value. Also, charities may feel implicit pressure from donors to state a
low estimate of value, although similar valuation temptations are
inherent throughout our tax system which allows charitable deductions
based on the value of property donated.255
In addition, valuation uncertainties may lead to enforcement and
dispute resolution costs. While some charities may hire competent
experts to determine the value of the ad impressions, others may be less
diligent, attracting potential IRS audits. The IRS may use their own
valuation experts, or hire outside experts, to determine if the charity‘s
(and the donor‘s) estimates are reasonable. If the parties‘ value
250. See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
251. See supra notes 147–52 and accompanying text.
252. See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
253. See supra notes 143–44 and accompanying text.
254. See I.R.C. §§ 170(f)(8), 6115(a)(2) (2006).
255. See Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-1(c)(2) (as amended in 2008); see also Treas. Reg. § 1.170A1(h)(4) (discussing reliance on donee estimates as to fair market value).
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estimates are not reasonable, the IRS will incur additional costs to
determine a reasonable estimate for audit purposes, and taxpayers
disputing the resulting IRS assessments will incur administrative and
potentially legal costs.
Also, the fair market value approach based on a hypothetical buyer
and a hypothetical seller may be unfair when the actual philanthropist
acquires no or only slight benefits from acquiring the naming rights
because of the philanthropist‘s particular circumstances. For example,
the naming donor may have an extremely common surname such as
Smith, Jones or Johnson.256
Similarly, there may be cases when a charitable naming right is really
of no benefit to the donor but greatly helps the charity, particularly when
the donor is a celebrity. For example, it would seem inappropriate to
reduce Betty Ford‘s charitable deduction for her contributions to the
Betty Ford Alcoholism Center257 because the naming may have
tarnished her reputation while greatly benefiting the charity. 258 In other
celebrity situations, the value of the naming right to the celebrity donor
may be ambiguous, but the benefit to the charity may be substantial.
Examples might include the Arnold Palmer Prostate Center,259 or Bob
Barker‘s animal rights endowments at eight U.S. law schools.260 In
these situations the charity may want to use the celebrity‘s name for
publicity, hoping that it will inspire others to give. 261 Also, there may be
situations when the donor is ambivalent about the publicity, but the
charity‘s officials feel that naming the building after the donor is an
256. Commonality may dilute the benefits to reputation. Others may be unsure about which
person named Smith donated the money and therefore is wealthy and generous.
257. See BETTY FORD CTR., http://www.bettyfordcenter.org (last visited Oct. 2, 2011).
258. But see Gergen, supra note 5, at 1395 (arguing that if philanthropists are truly altruistic they
will not care about the amount of their charitable tax deduction).
259. See
Arnold
Palmer
Prostate
Center,
EISENHOWER
MED.
CTR.,
http://www.emc.org/body.cfm?id=191 (last visited Oct. 2, 2011). On the one hand, famous golf legend
Arnold Palmer will increase his reputation for generosity; on the other hand, an affiliation with a disease
may diminish his effectiveness in endorsing products associated with physical and athletic excellence.
260. See Tamie L. Bryant, The Bob Barker Gifts to Support Animal Rights Law, 60 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 237, 241 (2010) (indicating that Barker‘s commitment to animal rights cost him financially;
―[Barker] resigned from hosting the Miss USA and Miss Universe beauty pageants–a financially
rewarding role he enjoyed–because furs were given as prizes.‖).
261. If the donor is highly respected in the community, the affiliation may help the charity‘s
reputation more than the donor‘s reputation.
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appropriate way to express gratitude.
The next subpart considers an alternative that could reduce
administrative, compliance, and enforcement costs, but may unduly
sacrifice the potential fairness gained from the fair market value
approach.
3. A Uniform Fraction Approach as a Backup
The fair market value approach has the potential to deliver equitable
results, and the focus on commercial value and the enhanced de minimis
exception262 may reduce administrative burdens, but in the end, fair
market valuation may prove unduly cumbersome. Accordingly, it is
appropriate to explore a potential backup method that this Article will
call the uniform263 fraction approach. The government has adopted this
type of approach in two prominent tax situations involving difficult
valuation issues.
First, in 1978, the IRS challenged members of the Church of
Scientology who claimed tax deductions for transfers to their church
made in connection with obtaining auditing and training services.264
Basically, the government asserted that the individual church members
received intangible religious benefits in exchange for their transfers to
the church, and therefore, the church members were not entitled to claim
charitable deductions. After eleven years of litigation, the U.S. Supreme
Court ruled in favor of the IRS,265 but the IRS promptly abandoned its
right to audit Scientologists on a case-by-case basis and dispute the fair
market value of the intangible religious benefits. Instead, the IRS
262. See supra Part III.D.2.b.
263. See Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 311 (1976) (holding that a Massachusetts
statute requiring state police officers to retire at age 50 did not violate the equal protection clause of the
U.S. Constitution even though expert testimony demonstrated that ―particular individuals over [age
fifty] could be capable of safely performing the functions of uniformed officers‖); see also id. at 314
(acknowledging that ―the drawing of lines that create distinctions is peculiarly a legislative task . . . [and
that] [p]erfection in making the necessary classification is neither possible nor necessary‖).
264. Rev. Rul. 78-189, 1978-1 C.B. 68 (declaring a Scientology member‘s fees for auditing and
training services nondeductible); see Hernandez v. Comm‘r, 490 U.S. 680, 684–85 (1989) (explaining
that auditing sessions identified the member‘s ―areas of spiritual difficulty,‖ and after completing the
auditing sessions, the Church member could participate in training sessions, which were ―doctrinal
courses . . . in [which the member] stud[ies] the tenets of Scientology . . . .‖).
265. Hernandez, 490 U.S. at 694.
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entered into a settlement agreement and adopted a uniform fraction
approach, which might be called the twenty-percent solution. Under this
approach, based on a twenty percent and eighty percent split, a
Scientologist can deduct eighty percent of the amounts paid for auditing
and training services as a charitable contribution, but he must treat the
twenty percent balance as a nondeductible personal expense.266
Second, in 1986 the IRS announced that when alumni contribute to a
university fund and, in return, receive the equivalent of private seat
licenses (commonly known as PSLs) for college football games, the
alumni cannot deduct the contribution to the extent of the fair market
value of the seating privileges.267 In one scenario, the university‘s home
football games regularly sell out in advance and are effectively
unavailable to an alumnus unless the alumnus pays the fixed amount
($300 in the ruling) to join the school‘s athletic scholarship program.
The IRS concluded that the taxpayer can attempt to establish the fair
market value of the right to purchase the tickets, and if the value is less
than $300, the taxpayer can deduct the excess.268 Three years later,
Congress concluded that the IRS position would entail valuation
disputes with huge numbers of individual taxpayers,269 abandoned the
fair market value approach, and adopted a uniform fraction approach
based on an eighty percent and twenty percent split.270 Any alumnus at
any school contributing and thereby acquiring a right to purchase
athletic tickets can deduct eighty percent of the amount transferred as a
charitable contribution, and twenty percent is a nondeductible personal
expense.
a. Advantages of a Uniform Fraction Approach; Possible Method
The

uniform

fraction

approach

could

eliminate

valuation

266. See Sklar v. Comm‘r, 125 T.C. 281, 298–99 (2005) (―According to a letter sent to petitioners
in 1994 from the chief of the [IRS] adjustments branch . . . the settlement . . . allows [Scientology
members] to claim, as charitable contributions, 80 percent of the cost of qualifying religious services.‖),
quoted in Wendy Gerzog, From the Greedy to the Needy, 87 OR. L. REV. 1133, 1135 n.5 (2008).
267. Rev. Rul. 86-63, 1986-1 C.B. 88.
268. Id. (concluding that if the taxpayer fails to meet this burden, the taxpayer cannot claim a
charitable deduction).
269. H.R. Rep. No. 100-795, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., at 523 (1988).
270. I.R.C. § 170(l) (2006).
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controversies and the attendant administrative, compliance, and dispute
resolution costs. Data is available that may suggest an appropriate
fraction. For a dual character271 transfer, a uniform fraction approach
will specify the deductible and nondeductible portions. In the athletic
booster club situation, the statute deems that the nondeductible value of
the seating privileges is always twenty percent of the total transfer to the
school. Presumably Congress made an assessment that twenty percent
was a reasonable fraction to apply in those cases.272
For charitable naming rights transfers, the nondeductible portion
should approximate the value of the naming rights. Approximating the
naming rights part might involve two steps: (1) estimating the typical
ask amount in charitable naming transactions; and (2) estimating the
value of the ad impressions provided by the naming rights.273
First, establishing the ask amount is an essential step for charities
conducting capital campaigns. A charitable consultant researched over
30,000 naming opportunities274 and noted a general rule of thumb in the
charitable market: charities typically set ask amounts for naming rights
at fifty percent of construction cost.275 Thus, a prospective donor
wishing to surname a charity‘s edifice will need to transfer
approximately half the cost of building the structure, a prospective
donor wishing to surname an elevator will need to pay half the cost of
the elevator, and so forth.
Second, estimating a uniform fraction for the value of the ad
impressions generated by a typical charitable naming rights arrangement
would require reference to another market, because as discussed in Part
III.D.2.a, the total ask amount in the charitable market mixes both
271. United States v. Am. Bar Endowment, 477 U.S. 105, 117 (adopting the ―dual character‖
terminology to describe a single transfer that is part contribution and part purchase).
272. But see Colombo, supra note 11, at 663 n.23 (asserting that the twenty percent fraction is
―arbitrary‖).
273. See supra notes 237–41 and accompanying text.
274. BURTON, supra note 15, at 167, 169 (―In the winter of 2008, it was estimated that there were
more than 50,000 naming opportunities published on the websites of nonprofits.‖); see also id. at 125–
69 (describing the process for developing a capital campaign utilizing naming rights).
275. Id. at 142 (―The general rule of thumb for naming a newly constructed building or outdoor
space is a donation equivalent to 50 [percent] of the project cost.‖). But see id. at 162–68 (maintaining
that each charity should consider a multitude of factors in setting the ask amount notwithstanding the
rule of thumb).
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generosity and the purchase of the naming rights. In regards to the pro
sports arena naming rights market,276 Appendix B lists the price of the
naming and related rights for nineteen venues constructed from 1994 to
2004 and calculates that the average price for a naming rights package is
between ten and fifteen percent of the total construction cost.277
Comparing the price of pro sports venue naming rights with the ask
amounts for charitable naming rights, it appears that the price of naming
and related rights may represent from twenty to thirty percent of the
philanthropist‘s total transfer in a charitable naming rights
arrangement.278 As stated in Part III.D.2.a, the publicized naming price
for pro sports venues often includes associated rights, and as a result, the
value of the ad impressions for charitable naming rights are likely less
than twenty to thirty percent.
An example can illustrate a uniform fraction approach based on a
twenty percent fraction. Imagine that a new law school will cost $10
million. Consistent with the fifty percent rule of thumb,279 the naming
philanthropist contributes $5 million. In this situation, the naming
philanthropist could treat $4 million as a tax-deductible charitable
contribution, and the $1 million balance would be the price of the
nondeductible naming rights.
b. Disadvantages of a Uniform Fraction Approach
A problem with a uniform fraction approach is that the fraction will
not be equitable in all situations. Congress‘s twenty percent solution to
the purchase of the right to buy tickets to college athletic events has
been called ―arbitrary,‖280 and a uniform rule on naming rights may
draw similar criticism.
276. Commercial concert venues, conference centers, and multifunction facilities also might
provide additional data. See BURTON, supra note 15, at 164; see also Ashley & O‘Hara, supra note 226,
at 6.
277. See Appendix B (calculating an average of 12.98 percent).
278. If the philanthropist contributes fifty percent of the construction cost, see supra note 275, and
the naming rights are worth ten to fifteen percent of the construction costs, see supra note 278 (by
analogy to the sports arena venue market), twenty to thirty percent of the philanthropist‘s transfer is for
the charitable naming rights.
279. See supra note 275 and accompanying text.
280. Colombo, supra note 11, at 663 n.23.
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In particular, the uniform fraction approach will be inequitable when
a donor pays far less, or far more, than the typical fifty percent rule of
thumb. For example, Bill Gates arguably executed a tremendous
bargain purchase when he donated only $6 million and Stanford
University named the $38 million Gates Computer Science Building.281
If a twenty percent uniform fraction approach had applied, Gates could
have deducted $4.8 million even though his true gift—based on the price
a hypothetical willing buyer would have paid for the naming rights—
may have been closer to $2.2 million.282
In other situations, the donor may contribute more than the fifty
percent of construction cost rule of thumb, and again, the uniform
fraction approach would be unfair. For example, an extraordinarily
generous donor may transfer $10 million to name a building that costs
$10 million to construct. In that case, the naming rights may be worth
only $1 million,283 but a twenty percent uniform fraction approach
would treat the donor as paying $2 million for the naming rights.
Furthermore, the complaints about the fair market value approach
when using hypothetical parties without taking into account the unique
characteristics of the actual parties also applies to the uniform fraction
approach.284 With the uniform fraction approach, Betty Ford could not
deduct twenty percent of her contributions, although she derives no
personal benefit from the naming rights at the Alcoholism Center.285
Nevertheless, in any situation in which the uniform fraction approach
would treat a philanthropist unfairly, the philanthropist could
circumvent the rule by donating anonymously, or by merely being
content with evanescent praise, including publicity in the charity‘s
281. Stanford Computer Science: Gates Computer Science Building, STANFORD UNIV. (Oct. 1,
2011), http://www-cs.stanford.edu/info/gates. In this naming transaction Bill Gates transferred an
amount equal to only 16 percent of the building‘s construction cost to Stanford; in typical charitable
naming transactions the patron must contribute fifty percent of the construction cost. See supra note 34
and accompanying text.
282. Presuming that naming rights are worth ten percent of total construction cost, see Appendix
B, the naming rights for a $38 million building are worth $3.8 million. If Bill Gates transferred a total
of $6 million and the value of the naming right was $3.8 million, the charitable contribution (the excess
amount) was only $2.2 million.
283. This presumes that naming rights are worth ten percent of construction costs. See Appendix
B; see also supra note 278 (stating the average price at 12.98 percent of construction costs).
284. See supra notes 256–61 and accompanying text.
285. See supra notes 257–58 and accompanying text.
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newsletter or adulation at a luncheon, dinner, or groundbreaking
ceremony.
E. Considering Other Counterarguments
Part III.C addresses counterarguments stated in IRS rulings, including
the assertion that public recognition has no monetary value. In addition,
Part III.D.2.d discusses the problem for named donors, including
celebrities, who do not benefit from naming arrangements.
1. Why Differentiate from the Warm Glow and Other Donor Perks?
Cynical commentators indicate that when individuals contribute it
―does not mean [they] are acting other than as rational, egoistic, pleasure
maximizers.‖286 Researchers have isolated many motives other than
genuine altruism that each theoretically constitutes a return benefit to the
donor. In addition to the prestige from naming rights, the list includes:
(1) an improved self-image,287 also described as a ―sense of selfrighteousness;‖288 (2) the personal pleasure or ―warm glow‖289 feeling;
(3) fulfilling the expectations of others, in the case of the wealthy
sometimes called ―noblesse oblige;‖290 (4) the public esteem available
even in the absence of naming rights, such as the adulation flowing from
transitory publicity in the charity‘s newsletter, its website, at luncheons,
dinners, and groundbreaking ceremonies; (5) the prospect that a
substantial gift will result in a seat on the charity‘s board of directors or
a position on a high-profile committee, leading to business and social

286. See, e.g., Gergen, supra note 5, at 1408; see also Kelman, supra note 9, at 880 (asserting that
―charitable donors are the same as everyone else in an individualist culture‖).
287. Gergen, supra note 5, at 1408–09 (referring to ―self-respect‖).
288. Colombo, supra note 11, at 671.
289. Brian Gale, Keep Charity Charitable, 88 TEX L. REV. 1213, 1222–23 (2010); Gergen, supra
note 5, at 1408 (The donor ―may find joy in doing good‖); Colombo, supra note 11, at 672.
290. OSTROWER, supra note 33, at 16; id. at 13 (―The vast majority of donors agreed that for
wealthier members of our society, philanthropy is not only a matter of personal choice, but is an
obligation.‖) (internal quotations omitted); see also Colombo, supra note 11, at 672 (stating that some
affluent individuals contribute to ―avoid the social opprobrium and scorn that [otherwise] would
result‖).
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connections with other wealthy individuals;291 (6) assuaging feelings of
guilt from accumulating excess riches, or otherwise ―legitimating
wealth;‖292 and (7) assuaging feelings of guilt that may arise from seeing
the suffering of others.293
Professor Kelman indicates that if tax law considered all these
motivations as return benefits, perhaps no portion of a transfer to charity
would qualify as a deductible contribution.294 Notwithstanding that
argument, this proposal maintains that naming rights are distinguishable
from these other donor benefits. Appraisers could reasonably estimate
the value of naming rights based on ad impressions,295 but a method for
reasonably appraising the warm glow or the improved self-image
remains elusive. In addition, the purchase of naming rights is voluntary,
meaning a philanthropist could donate anonymously. In contrast, many
of the benefits described above are unavoidable consequences. Finally,
as discussed in Part IV, notable naming rights may have serious adverse
societal consequences not associated with the other benefits.
Accordingly, the tax laws should reduce the charitable tax deduction for
the value of notable naming rights, and at least at this time, likely should
ignore the more nebulous donor benefits.
2. Would Charitable Giving Decline?
Any restriction on the tax benefits of charitable giving likely will
diminish contributions. This Article‘s proposal would increase a
philanthropist‘s after-tax cost of a naming arrangement. As a result,
some benefactors may be more hesitant to give a fixed ask amount and
291. OSTROWER, supra note 33, at 45–47; id. at 48 (―Through . . . board memberships . . . and
related mechanisms, elites carve out a separate world for themselves through philanthropy.‖).
292. Id. at 13.
293. Colombo, supra note 11, at 674–76 (observing that if a person feels empathy with a suffering
individual or group, the person will feel distress and will want to eliminate those feelings).
294. Kelman, supra note 9, at 880.
295. See supra Part III.D.2.a; Ashley & O‘Hara, supra note 226, at 17 (―The number of ad
impressions generated will drive most replacement cost analysis, and thus need to be calculated.‖);
Gerrard, Parent & Slack, supra note 226, at 11 (―[T]he fundamental value of the asset depends primarily
on the . . . advertising messages generated and consequent increased sales . . . .‖); DeSchriver & Jensen,
supra note 133, at 362 (―[I]t is reasonable to view the market for stadium names as a market for
advertising space.‖).
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might negotiate a lower ask amount. Other benefactors might settle for
a less expensive naming right296 or make no gift at all. Charities might
downsize the ask amounts for naming rights generally.
A drop in charitable giving, however, does not necessarily mean the
total amount of funds available for beneficial projects drops. As
discussed in Part II.B, the government reimburses donors for a portion
of charitable gifts through tax benefits. In the case of donations by the
wealthy shortly before death, the government may bear approximately
sixty-five percent of the cost.297 Thus, a one dollar drop in charitable
donations can trigger a sixty-five cent increase in tax revenue available
for humanitarian projects such as poverty relief, environmental cleanup,
and foreign aid.
This leads to two controversies. First, does society benefit more from
an additional sixty-five cents in government spending or from one dollar
in charitable spending? The charitable money may fund a symphony,298
a drag strip for race enthusiasts,299 seminars for yachtsmen training to
represent the United States at sailing events in exotic foreign
locations,300 or any of the other varied activities that qualify to receive
tax-deductible contributions under current law.301 On the other hand,
many argue that not all government spending is prudent.
Second, researchers debate the extent to which the total amount
available for worthwhile causes fluctuates with changes to the charitable
deduction rules.
Some people donate regardless of the tax
consequences; they would contribute even if there were no charitable
deduction.302 With respect to these donors, a change in law preventing a
charitable deduction would have no impact on their charitable giving,
296. See, e.g., supra note 46 and accompanying text (listing the various ask amounts donors can
choose from in connection with a School of Engineering‘s capital campaign).
297. See supra notes 95–98 and accompanying text.
298. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(3)(ii), ex. 4 (as amended in 2008).
299. See Lions Associated Drag Strip v. United States, 64-1 U.S.T.C. ¶ 9283 (S.D. Cal. 1963).
300. Rev. Rul. 64-275, 1964-2 C.B. 142.
301. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 68-372, 1968-2 C.B. 205 (a sports hall of fame is tax-exempt and eligible
to receive tax deductible contributions); Rev. Rul. 67-148, 1967-1 C.B. 132 (an organization conducting
civil war reenactments is tax-exempt and eligible to receive tax deductible contributions).
302. See William A. Drennan, Charitable Donation of Intellectual Property: The Case for
Retaining the Fair Market Value Deduction, 2004 UTAH L. REV. 1045, 1140 (stating that these donors
give and do not count the cost).
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and would increase taxes paid, thereby increasing the total funds
available for worthwhile projects. Researchers studying the elasticity of
charitable giving disagree about whether restrictions in the charitable tax
deduction will inspire a decrease in charitable donations greater than,
equal to, or less than, the resulting increase in tax revenue available to
the government.303
Even if this Article‘s proposal will reduce charitable donations in
excess of the corresponding increase in government tax revenues, the
proposal provides other important benefits, namely improved horizontal
equity, greater respect for the tax system, and greater honesty in
fundraising.304
3. Can Philanthropists Deduct the Naming Part as a Business Expense?
Theoretically, philanthropists in business might try to deduct the
naming portion as a business expense, alleging the purchase enhances
their business reputation rather than their personal reputation.
Applicable
Treasury
Regulations,
however,
prevent
such
gamesmanship. Specifically, regulations prohibit a business deduction
whenever part of a transfer to charity qualifies as a charitable
deduction.305
This longstanding rule prevents taxpayers from
circumventing restrictions on claiming charitable deductions,306
303. See, e.g., Gergen, supra note 5, at 1404 (discussing study by Hochman and Rodgers); Todd
Izzo, A Full Spectrum of Light: Rethinking the Charitable Contribution Deduction, 141 U. PA. L. REV.
2371, 2385–86 (1993); Wiedenbeck, supra note 183, at 95 (―[T]he best available economic research
indicates that the tax deduction is efficient.‖) (emphasis omitted). But see Kevin Stanton Barrett, Anya
M. McGuirk & Richard Steinberg, Further Evidence on the Dynamic Impact of Taxes on Charitable
Giving, 50 NAT‘L TAX J. 321 (1997) (―results challenge the view that tax deductions for charitable
giving are efficient‖); Colombo, supra note 11, at 683–84 (―More recent studies . . . indicate that the
price elasticity is less than one . . . .‖).
304. See supra Part III.A.3; see also infra Part IV.
305. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-15 (1965) (―No deduction is allowable under [I.R.C. §] 162(a) for a
contribution or gift by an individual or a corporation if any part thereof is deductible under [I.R.C.
§] 170. For example, if a taxpayer [contributes] $5,000 and only $4,000 . . . is deductible under [I.R.C.
§] 170(a) . . . no deduction is allowable under [I.R.C. §] 162(a) for the remaining $1,000.‖). But see
Singer v. United States, 449 F.2d 413, 421 (Ct. Cl. 1971) (―[W]e are of the opinion that if the transfer to
a charitable organization does not qualify as [an I.R.C.] section 170 deduction . . . it might be deductible
under [I.R.C.] section 162, if all other requirements are met.‖).
306. I.R.C. § 162(b) (2006) (―No deduction shall be allowed [as a business expense] for any
contribution or gift, which would be allowable as a deduction under [I.R.C.] section 170 were it not for
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encourages taxpayers to decide upfront whether a transfer is charitable
or mercantile,307 and frees the IRS and the courts from the potential
morass of determining motive, intent, and impact when a taxpayer seeks
to change the characterization of a transfer after the initially desired
charitable contribution deduction is unavailable.308 The regulatory
approach may be suspect, particularly when applied to business entities,
but it does provide clarity by forcing taxpayers to choose between
structuring a transfer as a charitable donation or a business expense if
the taxpayer desires to deduct the entire transfer.
IV. CONCLUSION: CURRENT LAW ENCOURAGES PHILANTHROPISTS TO
FUND BRICKS AND MORTAR FOR THE SYMPHONY INSTEAD OF FOOD FOR
THE HOMELESS
This Article‘s proposal to eliminate the tax deduction for the naming
portion of a transfer to charity will (1) advance horizontal equity by
treating naming philanthropists like other donors who receive a return
benefit from a charity; (2) improve taxpayer confidence in the fairness
of the U.S. tax system, and may in turn improve voluntary compliance;
and (3) free charitable fundraisers from the current duplicative milieu in
which the charity advertises naming rights like a commodity, enters into
a contractually binding agreement with the benefactor, and then
proclaims that the naming right was not a return benefit to the
philanthropist.309 The current situation compels our charities to issue
dubious documents and make suspect statements to comply with the tax
laws and accommodate benefactors.310 This Article proposes a viable
the percentage limitations, the dollar limitations, or the requirements as to the time of payment, set forth
in [section 170].‖).
307. Rev. Rul. 72-314, 1972-1 C.B. 44 (stating that whether a transfer to a charity is a charitable
gift or a business expense depends on whether the payment ―bear[s] a direct relationship to the
taxpayer‘s business and [is] made with a reasonable expectation of a financial return commensurate with
the amount of the payment.‖); Rev. Rul. 73-113, 1973-1 C.B. 65 (emphasizing the importance of the
taxpayer‘s reasonable expectations for a commensurate financial benefit).
308. See Dagan, supra note 137, at 597. Dagan also highlights the difficulty of such an inquiry
because ―[t]here is unfortunately, no theoretically satisfactory boundary between business expenses that
provide incidental personal benefits and personal expenditures that incidentally serve business
purposes . . . .‖ Id. (alteration in original).
309. See supra notes 147–52 and accompanying text.
310. See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
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approach for implementing the fundamental claim consistent with the
current regulatory structure for valuing charitable gifts and documenting
donations.
Correcting the tax treatment for charitable naming arrangements may
have broad beneficial effects. The ability of wealthy philanthropists to
buy naming rights and deduct the entire amount transferred may be
triggering profound adverse consequences in the charitable world.
Philanthropists evaluating potential charitable recipients may choose the
charity that can sell the best publicity package, rather than the charity
with the best plan for helping the poor or cleaning the environment.311
Benefactors seeking to fund education may choose to have their names
emblazoned across prestigious university campuses312 while ignoring
petitions from lower-ranked institutions. Patrons trying to select a
charitable cause may buy naming rights from the symphony
constructing a grand new edifice, rather than contributing to help stock
the shelves at the food pantry.313 Current law treats donors the same
whether or not they indulge their propensity for pride when acting
generously.
Furthermore, charities may structure their activities to offer taxadvantaged naming rights. Rather than repairing the boiler and patching
the roof, the charity may decide to build a new structure and sell naming
rights to fund it. A consultant observes that billion dollar fundraising
campaigns abound in the new naming rights era, and he asks whether
these campaigns are undertaken because they are needed or because they
are possible.314 These broader issues highlight that ending the special
exception for the naming portion is vital.

311. Miranda Perry Fleischer, Charitable Contributions in an Ideal Estate Tax, 60 TAX L. REV.
263, 302 (2007) (stating that due to the ―edifice complex‖ ―bequests to large, wealthy organizations
such as colleges or museums fund more capital projects (such as buildings) than are actually needed.‖).
312. See, e.g., Ron Rapoport, Book Exposes College Athletics as Bad Business, DAILY NEWS (Los
Angeles), Sept. 2, 1990, at S1, available at 1990 WLNR 991166; see also Sarah E. Waldeck, The
Coming Showdown Over University Endowments: Enlisting the Donors, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 1795,
1818–19 (2009) (arguing for a ―cap‖ on deductions that contribute to the purchase or construction of
depreciable assets . . . ” and pointing to an ―edifice complex‖ under which ―some major donors prefer to
put their names on new buildings that require ‗massive additional investment in both construction and
long-term maintenance‘‖ rather than scholarships or operating activities).
313. See Waldeck, supra note 312.
314. BURTON, supra note 15, at 19 (asking ―is this about entitlement or need?‖).
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Appendix A: Recommended Statute
I.R.C. § 170(f) Disallowance of deduction in certain cases and special
rules—
....
(8) Substantiation requirements for certain contributions –
....
Paragraph (E) of Section 170(f)(8) is hereby changed to Paragraph (F)
and a new Paragraph (E) is hereby added to provide as follows:
(E) Special rules for naming rights:
(i) If the donee organization provides name recognition in
consideration, in whole or in part, for any money or property
contributed:
(I) the value of such naming rights shall equal the price at which
the naming rights would be sold by a hypothetical commercial
seller to a hypothetical commercial buyer if each had reasonable
knowledge of the relevant facts and each was under no
compulsion to buy or sell, considering only the expected benefits
from the resulting advertising impressions, and without
considering any additional value attributable to the advertising
impressions being related to a charitable item or fund; and
(II) such name recognition shall be disregarded for purposes of
this subsection if the donee organization‘s cost, and the value of
the naming rights benefit to the contributor (as determined under
clause (i)), do not exceed ten times the maximum amounts
considered insubstantial under regulations prescribed by the
Secretary for goods or services provided in consideration of
charitable contributions generally.
(ii) For purposes of this subsection, a donee organization provides
name recognition if:
(I) the taxpayer or any related person, directly or indirectly,
acquires the right to name a campus, a building, or any other
physical structure or location, or any physical item, or any fund or
other account of any kind, owned or used by the donee
organization, or acquires the right to have a picture, portrait or
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other likeness displayed at a location owned or used by the donee
organization, or acquires the right to have a name appear on a
plaque or other location, owned or used by the donee
organization, or
(II) the taxpayer‘s name or the name of any person related to the
taxpayer (even if deceased) is used to name a campus, building, or
any other physical structure or location, or any physical item, or
any fund or other account of any kind, owned or used by the
donee organization, or a picture, portrait or other likeness of the
taxpayer or any person related to the taxpayer (even if deceased)
is displayed at a location owned or used by the donee
organization, or the taxpayer‘s name or the name of any person
related to the taxpayer (even if deceased) appears on a plaque or
other location, owned or used by the donee organization.
A donee organization does not provide name recognition to a taxpayer
when the taxpayer‘s name appears in press releases or other similar
announcements, or in the donee organization‘s newsletter, website or
other similar communication materials.
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Appendix B: Pro Sports Arenas:
The Price of Naming Rights Compared to Construction Costs
This chart contains data for nineteen naming rights deals from 1994
to 2004 in which (i) the sports authority or other owner constructed a
new professional football stadium, baseball park, or basketball arena;
(ii) in connection with the construction the sports authority or other
owner sold naming rights to a commercial enterprise; and (iii) the
duration of the naming rights purchased was twenty years. 315 In
estimating the cost of the naming rights, (i) the annual payments are
presumed to continue for forty years (the entire depreciable life of a
stadium or arena for tax purposes); and (ii) the present value of the
stream of forty annual payments is determined using the annual prime
rate of interest for the year in which the owner sold the naming rights.316

315. The League of Fans website summarizes naming rights arrangements for National Football
League teams, Major League Baseball teams, and National Basketball Association teams. See Selling
Out
the
Fans
and
Taxpayers:
NFL,
LEAGUE
OF
FANS,
http://www.leagueoffans.org/nflnamingrights.html (last visited Oct. 2, 2011) (football); Selling Out the
Fans and Taxpayers: MLB, LEAGUE OF FANS, http://www.leagueoffans.org/mlbnamingrights.html (last
visited Oct. 2, 2011) (baseball); See Selling Out the Fans and Taxpayers: NBA, LEAGUE OF FANS,
http://www.leagueoffans.org/nbanamingrights.html (last visited Oct. 2, 2011) (basketball). These
summaries provide (1) the team name, (2) the stadium name, (3) the amount the commercial enterprise
pays each year for the naming rights and associated rights, (4) the year the owner sold the naming rights.
In order to compare the price of the naming rights to the total construction cost (and adjust for the time
value of money), the approximate present value of the stream of naming right payments is calculated
based on the average prime rate of interest for the year the owner sold the naming rights. The chart
excludes one naming rights arrangement because the price quoted for the naming rights included other
rights that may have equaled or exceeded the value of the naming rights. In 1999 Phillips Electronics
paid $185 million to name the home of the Atlanta Hawks basketball team Phillips Arena, and in the
deal with Ted Turner, Phillips Electronics acquired an array of business and marketing benefits
including ―first consideration by [Ted] Turner . . . to buy Phillips electronics [and] . . . [the] [u]se of
Cartoon Network characters to sell Phillips products.‖ See Ashley & O‘Hara, supra note 226, at 14.
316. See Prime Interest Forecast, FORECASTCHART.COM, http://www.forecast-chart.com/yearprime-interest.html (last visited Oct. 2, 2011) (listing the ―average annual rates for the Prime Interest
Rate . . . 1949 to 2010‖); see also Present and Future Value Tool, UIC.EDU,
www.uic.edu/classes/actg/actg500/pfvatutor.htm (last visited Oct. 2, 2011) (using ―Present Amount of
Ordinary Annuity‖ to calculate the ―Present Value Factor‖ and the ―Present Value of Annuity $‖ upon
entering the ―Payment Amount,‖ ―Interest Rate,‖ ―Number of Payments,‖ and clicking ―Calculate‖); see
supra note 134 (explaining that a stadium has a forty-year life for tax depreciation purposes).
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Stadium, Park, or Arena—
Team Name

Year
[Prime Rate]

109

Total
Construction
Cost*

Present
Value of
Payments for
Naming
Rights*

Percent

$517M

$23.88M

4.62%

$414M

$21.57M

5.21%

$173M

$9.12M

5.27%

$152M

$9.18M

6.04%

$300M

$20.13M

6.71%

$233M

$17.23M

7.40%

[sport]
(PV Factor)
(annual payment)
1. Safeco Field—Seattle
Mariners

1999
[7.99%]

[baseball]
(11.94)
($2 million)
2. Miller Park—Milwaukee
Brewers

2000
[9.23%]

[baseball]
(10.52)
($2.05 million)
3. Jacobs Field—Cleveland
Indians

1994
[7.14%]

[baseball]
(13.12)
($695,000)
4. Gunn Arena—Cleveland
Cavaliers

1994
[7.14%]

[basketball]
13.12
($700,000)
5. TWA Dome—St. Louis
Rams

1995
[8.83%]

[football]
10.94
($1.84 million)
6. PNC Park—Pittsburgh
Pirates

1998
[8.35%]

[baseball]
(11.49)
($1.5 million)
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7. Air Canada Centre—Toronto
Raptors

1999

[VOL. 80

$265M

$23.88M

9.01%

$260M

$25.04M

9.36%

$241.3M

$25.07M

10.39%

$300M

$35.88M

11.96%

$175M

$23.88M

13.65%

$150M

$23.62M

15.75%

$90M

$14.20M

15.78%

[7.99%]
[basketball]
(11.94)
($2 million)
8. MCI Center—Washington
Wizards

1997
[8.44%]

[basketball]
(11.38)
($2.2 million)
9. America Airlines Arena—
Miami Heat

1999
[7.99%]

[basketball]
(11.94)
($2.1 million)
10. Ford Field—Detroit Lions
[football]

2002
[4.68%]

($2 million)

17.94

11. Conseco Field House—
Indiana Pacers

1999
[7.99%]

[basketball]
11.94
($2 million)
12. United Center—Chicago
Bulls

1994
[7.14%]

[basketball]
(13.12)
($1.8 million)
13. Delta Center—Utah Jazz

1991

[basketball]

[8.46%]

($1.25 million)

(11.36)
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14. Heinz Field—Pittsburgh
Steelers

2001

111

$244M

$39.03M

16.00%

$321M

$59.7M

18.60%

$175M

$37.67M

21.53%

$360M

$80.76M

22.43%

$520M

$125.58M

24.15%

$165M

$40.6M

24.61%

$5,055.3M

$656.02M

12.98%

[6.92%]
[football]
(13.46)
($2.9 million)
15. Staples Center—Los
Angeles Lakers/Los Angeles
Clippers

[7.99%]

[basketball]

(11.94)

($5 million)
16. SBC Center—San Antonio
Spurs

1999

2002
[4.68%]

[basketball]
(17.94)
($2.1 million)
17. Invesco Field at Mile
High—Denver Broncos

2001
[6.92%]

[football]
(13.46)
($6 million)
18. Lincoln Financial Field—
Philadelphia Eagles

2002
[4.68%]

[football]
(17.94)
($7 million)
19. Pepsi Center—Denver
Nuggets

1999
[7.99%]

[basketball]
(11.94)
($3.4 million)
Total

* = Millions
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